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Review Symposium 
The English School in Retrospect and Prospect: Barry Buzan’s An Introduction to the English School 
of International Relations: The Societal Approach 
For publication in: Cooperation and Conflict 15 (1) 2016 
Introduction by Symposium Editor 
 
Over the last few decades the English School has not only emerged, but has been acknowledged as a 
distinctive approach to the study of International Relations (IR). It is routinely listed in textbooks and 
disciplinary surveys as one of IR’s primary modes of inquiry, attracting interest and adherents in 
many parts of the world. This state of affairs is attributable to the work of a number of people, but 
especially to that of Barry Buzan. More than ‘reconvening’ the school, a metaphor misleading in 
some ways, Buzan has led, pushed and challenged his colleagues to better clarify and define their 
ideas, concepts and theories, as well as to put the English School on a much sounder organizational 
footing. Buzan’s latest book builds on his previous (2004) volume to provide an introduction for 
readers new to the school. But it does much more than this, providing a ‘state of the debate’ on such 
demanding matters as the expansion of international society, and the pluralist-solidarist divide. It 
also links present research efforts to the classics, putting into perspective and defining the school’s 
current research agenda for the next phase of its development. It has the potential to become a 
landmark work on a par with the classic work of the early English School, Hedley Bull’s The 
Anarchical Society. But how does Buzan’s research agenda respond to the requirements of an 
increasingly diverse and fragmenting discipline? Are his preferred analytical concepts and categories 
sound? Of what pitfalls should newcomers to the school be made aware? In this symposium five 
established scholars closely associated with the English School seek to answer these questions, and 
in dialogue with Buzan, further advance our understanding of the school’s ‘societal’ approach and its 
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potential for deepening our understanding of what at times appears a highly unsocial world. The 
approach of the section is ‘internal’ as opposed to ‘external’ critique. External critiques of the English 
School are well known (see e.g. Finnemore, 2001). The section proceeds on the assumption that at 
this stage of its development the school’s approach can be most effectively advanced by vigorous 
debate between those who share the same broad research agenda with little purpose being served 
by reiterating the already well known ‘external’ objections. 
The symposium is based on a roundtable discussion held at the EISA conference, Warsaw, 
September 2013, in which Zhang, Wilson, Navari, and Buzan took part. I am grateful to these 
contributors as well as to Knudsen and Sharp for their timely and thought-provoking contributions. 
Peter Wilson, London School of Economics and Political Science 
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Pluralism, Solidarism and the Yin-Yang of International Society 
Yongjin Zhang, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, UK 
Keywords: English School; international society; solidarism; pluralism; primary institutions 
 
An Introduction to the English School of International Relations (hereafter IESIR) by Barry Buzan is 
written in the true spirit of the English School (hereafter ES) theorizing of international relations as ‘a 
great conversation’. Purporting to provide ‘a comprehensive guide to the English School’s approach 
to international society that will serve the needs of beginners’ (Buzan, 2014: vii), IESIR is purposively 
framed into historical/structural and normative accounts of the ES approaches to theorizing. This 
entails a methodological separation of the two accounts of the ES. This is, however, paralleled by 
Buzan’s attempts at a comprehensive synthesis of the historical/structural and normative thrusts of 
the ES as a holistic theoretical tradition in his deliberation. Some readers may find Buzan’s 
elaborations of the normative orientations of the ES (in Part III) also inescapably structural, 
particularly in his historical and evolutionary account of the rise and demise of primary institutions, 
whether pluralist or solidarist in nature.  
 
It would hardly escape any careful reader’s attention that IESIR is heavily biased towards an account 
of the normative orientation of the ES, not in the least because the length that IESIR devotes to the 
consideration of the normative side of the ES story. It is also because of Buzan’s declared intention 
to use this introductory text to intervene in the normative debates between pluralism and solidarism 
within the ES, which has generated some ‘unnecessary heat’ (Buzan, 2014: 170). In some existing 
accounts, pluralism and solidarism have been presented as a proverbial and largely mutually 
exclusive duality in the evolution of international society with a legendary division of ‘pluralist wing’ 
vis-à-vis ‘a solidarist wing’ within the ES (Bain, 2014: 165; Hurrell, 2014: 147). In other accounts, 
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pluralism and solidarism are billed as situated ‘at the heart of the English School theorizing 
enterprise’, since a vocabulary of pluralism and solidarism has been increasingly used to empirically 
describe, theoretically explain and normatively evaluate the transformation of international society 
(Bain, 2014: 167-8). It is clear that recent ES scholarship has invested so much in this debate that the 
stakes for the protagonists of each side, and more generally for ‘the English School’s standing as 
theory’ (Buzan, 2014: vii), have never been higher.  
 
Pluralism/Solidarism debate and divide 
It is revealing that Buzan frames his discussion of the normative orientations of the ES as ‘pluralism 
and solidarism’, not ‘pluralism versus solidarism’. Buzan’s analytical and synthetic narrative of the 
normative story of the ES is informed by contentions embedded in three interrelated and somewhat 
entangled facets of the pluralism/solidarism debate/divide within the ES. The first facet concerns the 
moral dilemma between the pursuit of order and the pursuit of justice in an anarchical international 
society. Central to the concern of classical ES scholars was how difficult moral questions often arise 
in the society of states and why from time to time terrible moral choices have to be made. The 
importance attached to the core values of survival and co-existence of states and the attention paid 
to pluralist primary institutions such as sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, war and great 
power management to sustain such social order have led some to conclude that there is a clear 
preference of order over justice in the classical ES scholarship, particularly in Bull (1977). Such 
assertions have been hotly contested. The morality of the pluralist order has been passionately 
defended (Jackson 2000; Mayall 2000), as global international society moves beyond the Cold War 
context that so conditioned Bull’s thinking.   
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If the classical account of pluralism and solidarism is attributable to Bull (1966), it is in the debates 
among the postclassical ES scholars that the order/justice juxtaposition has been formalized into the 
pluralist versus solidarist divide about normative changes in the post-Cold War international society. 
This divide has been deepened by the emergence of human rights culture, and in particular the 
changing legitimacy, norms and practices of humanitarian intervention, so much so that ‘pluralism 
versus solidarism’ is sometimes seen as ‘one of the principal axes of difference in the English School 
thinking after the end of the Cold War’ (Dunne, 2008: 275). Contestations about the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention underscore such a pluralist/solidarist divide. This is the second facet of 
the pluralism/solidarism debate, which is perhaps the most contentious and divisive. Each side has 
staked out a position on a number of important normative questions. Are we living in ‘a qualitatively 
different kind of international society’ (Hurrell, 2007: 58)? In descriptive terms, has global 
international society on balance become more solidarist or does it remain principally pluralist? 
Normatively, is pluralism still ethically defensible in the post-Cold War world? Is the purported 
ethical superiority of solidarism superficial or deep? Humanitarian intervention has, therefore, 
become literally the battleground for the pluralist/solidarist debates in the first decade of the 21st 
century. As Buzan (2014: 95) notes, while both Robert Jackson and James Mayall ‘defend the 
importance of prudence and responsibility in the practice of statecraft. … [and] oppose the solidarist 
project of transforming international society from a practical into a purposive or “enterprise” 
association’, Nicholas Wheeler (2000) asserts that humanitarian intervention has become a 
legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-use of force to rectify 
what Hurrell (2007: 57) calls ‘the moral failings of pluralism’.  
 
Much anxiety about the pluralist/solidarist divide in this particular debate rests on the solidarist 
claim of the moral high ground with the pluralist defence of order being characterized as 
‘conservative’ and the solidarist prioritizing of justice as ‘progressive’ in the transformation of 
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international society. While moral-philosophical debates within the ES about the ‘pluralist’ good of 
order and toleration and the ‘solidarist’ concern about justice are healthy, these debates are 
dangerously slipping into a dichotomous and divisive understanding of pluralism versus solidarism as 
constituting irreconcilable conflicts, oblivious to the fact that the co-evolving relationality of 
pluralism/solidarism was originally set up by Bull and Wight ‘as a debate rather than a taking of 
mutually exclusive positions’ (Buzan, 2014: 93). This co-evolving nature of pluralism and solidarism is 
again underscored, as ‘the intractability of the international system to liberal prescriptions become 
more evident’ in recent years and as the global order has been pushed back ‘in a broadly 
Westphalian direction’ (Hurrell, 2014: 161-62), which thrown into question the potentialities of 
progressive normative transformation of international society in the linear direction that solidarists 
would prefer.  
 
The third facet of the pluralist/solidarist debate is related to the interplay between international 
society and world society, ‘the push and pull of the ideal and the real’, with the moral vision of world 
society embodying ‘the more maximalist ethical ambitions’ of the ES tradition (Cochran, 2014: 196). 
One prevailing assumption is that world society as a human-centric community is inherently 
solidarist. By the same token, solidarism with its ethically cosmopolitan values could be a ‘mid-wife’ 
to world society, whereas pluralism with its emphasis on the minimalist order is integral to the 
society of states. Such characterization of the contested nature of the relationship between 
international society and world society has a number of critics.  Buzan (2014: 96) notes that John 
Williams, among others, has made a number of attempts to disentangle the unyielding association of 
solidarism with world society. Williams (2005: 29) has contended in particular that world society is 
inherently pluralist, given its primordial ethical diversity, whereas the society of states is at least 
potentially solidarist because of the intrinsic presence of elements of world society. While 
democratic peace theory demonstrates the potentiality of inter-state society to be solidarist, 
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globalization has made it imperative to understand that world society as an empirical phenomenon 
can be intensely pluralist, not only by virtue of the perennial existence of diversity in ethical systems, 
worldviews and understandings but also because of the need to respect and protect such diversity.  
 
Institutional account of evolving pluralism and solidarism  
Buzan (2014: 85-6) is explicit about a need ‘to rescue the pluralist/solidarist debate from the 
excessive polarization into which it has fallen and to recover the sense from the classical three 
traditions of the English School that both are always in play’. More specifically, Buzan hopes that 
clarifying the distinction between cosmopolitan solidarism and state-centric solidarism will help 
‘remove some unnecessary heat from this debate by making clear that there is more common 
ground than is at first apparent (Buzan 2014: 170).’ Buzan’s purpose is to build a bridge between the 
pluralism/solidarism divide. How does he do this?  
 
It is worth recalling that IESIR is not Buzan’s first significant intervention in the pluralist/solidarist 
debate. Over a decade ago, Buzan (2004) made earnest efforts to untangle the aphoristic link 
between solidarism and liberal cosmopolitan values in an attempt to establish solidarism as 
‘covering a swath of the spectrum from “pluralism-plus” through Kantianism to the fringes of 
federation’ (Adler, 2005: 174). This particular formulation suggests that pluralism and solidarism are 
not necessarily two radically different alternatives in the evolution of international society. While 
lamenting that world society is theoretically underdeveloped and has become ‘an analytical dustbin’ 
in some ES works (Buzan, 2004: 44), Buzan also tried to ‘transcend a normative conception of world 
society as representing the becoming of a Kantian cosmopolitan community, thereby making 
analytical room for non-liberal world societies’ (Adler, 2005: 173). The manifested solidarism in 
global uncivil societies in this instance does not favour any move towards world society of the 
8 
 
Kantian persuasion. World society cannot be normatively grounded only on the liberal conception of 
the individual. This analytical untangling and structural reading of pluralism/international society 
and solidarism/world society divide should not be a surprise, as Buzan has been firmly placed in the 
analytical wing of the ES (Dunne 2008).  
 
The principal purpose of Buzan’s intervention, then as now, is not to engage in moral arguments or 
ethical assessment for or against either. To the extent that Part III of IESIR can be read as Buzan’s 
continuing intervention in the pluralist/solidarist debate, three moves are notable. First, Buzan goes 
out of his way to provide a more detailed and certainly updated historical account of how primary 
institutions of both pluralist and solidarist characterizations have evolved in constituting 
transformation of international society. As Buzan (2004: 167) argued a decade ago, a focus on the 
account of historical evolution of primary institutions is warranted because primary institutions are 
‘constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other’. In Chapter 7 
and Chapter 9 respectively, Buzan (2014: 113) takes upon himself to provide a ‘historical 
developmental perspective on primary institutions’, i.e. to sketch an institutional account of the 
evolutionary nature of both pluralism and solidarism and their intimate linkage by tracing the rise, 
demise and changing interpretations and practices of primary institutions and the dynamic 
processes associated with them.  
 
Buzan (2014: 135) is careful in spelling out, though, that he understands solidarist values ‘to mean 
both bringing world society into play in relation to interstate society and moving interstate society 
beyond a logic of coexistence into one of cooperation and convergence.’ For some, Buzan’s historical 
and institutional account, as it is structured, may prove to be particularly difficult to read in terms of 
untangling pluralism from solidarism. While it is relatively straightforward to follow Buzan’s account 
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of the demise of dynasticism, imperialism/colonialism and human inequality as institutional 
practices of pluralism, and to understand his explanation of the rise of the market, democracy, 
human rights and environmental stewardship as institutional practices of solidarism, they are likely 
to struggle to figure out why some classical pluralist institutions such as sovereignty and non-
intervention, great power management, international law and war can be at once pluralist and 
solidarist and how to make sense of a significant divestment of liberalism from solidarism in this 
institutional account. It is however precisely ‘the internal revolutions of practices’ that these primary 
institutions have been undergoing (Buzan, 2014: 134) and this tangled linkage between pluralism 
and solidarism that Buzan intends to highlight. In Buzan’s (2014: 87) own words, ‘the historical 
accounts of Chapters 7 and 9 of how primary institutions have evolved are intended as much to 
unfold the story of the developing structure of international society as they are to illustrate the 
practical interweaving of pluralism and solidarism’. These accounts are provided in this fashion, 
therefore, for a specific purpose, i.e. to ‘check empirically both how the balance between pluralism 
and solidarism and the social structure of international society in terms of primary institutions are 
evolving’ (Buzan, 2014: 133). 
 
State-centric solidarism  
The second move that Buzan has taken aims at untangling cosmopolitan solidarism in rhetoric from 
state-centric solidarism in practice. The need to examine ‘different types of solidarism’ has been 
acknowledged by Alex Bellamy (2005: 292) and Andrew Hurrell (2007), among others. The latter has 
noted in particular that there are other forms of solidarism than liberal solidarism, such as The Holy 
Alliance as ‘a reactionary form of state solidarism’ and ‘an Islamic form of state solidarism’ (Hurrell, 
2007: 59). Hurrell (2007: 63-65, 2014: 149) also sees the move from consensual solidarism to 
coercive solidarism as a new feature of liberal solidarism. Buzan’s major concern is, however, the 
unfortunate entanglement of state-centric and cosmopolitan solidarism in the existing literature and 
10 
 
the unnecessary tension such unhelpful entanglement has caused in the pluralist/solidarist debate. 
Having divested liberalism largely from solidarism in his 2004 work, he is convinced that clarifying 
the distinction between state-centric solidarism and cosmopolitan solidarism is a fruitful way of 
further ‘untangling many elements of the pluralist/solidarist debate and exposing which tensions are 
real and which merely rhetorical’. Such untangling is imperative and is conducive to abandoning ‘the 
habit of thinking about pluralist and solidarist orders as representing opposed ideas’ (Buzan, 2014: 
115). 
 
Such entanglement is attributable, Buzan (2014: 116-19) argues, in part at least, to ‘the pluralists’ 
rhetorical tendency to construct solidarism in largely cosmopolitan terms’ or in other words, to the 
presence of solidarism in the pluralist side of the debate as ‘the bogeyman that threatens the 
international order by undermining the sovereignty that underpins the society of states’. This has led 
to the construction of the view that pluralism and solidarism are irreconcilable and mutually 
exclusive by Robert Jackson, ‘a militant, enthusiast pluralist’, among others, taking cues from Bull’s 
notion that a ‘cosmopolitan community of individual human beings’ represents an alternative 
ordering principle to a society of states.  This classical pluralist bogeyman image of radical 
cosmopolitanism as represented in solidarism, Buzan (2014: 131-32) maintains, finds little resonance 
in the mainstream solidarist literature.  
 
Attempts at untangling state-centric solidarism from cosmopolitan solidarism have also led Buzan to 
offer a rather broad, and arguably too encompassing, definition of solidarism. For Buzan, solidarism 
in the current pluralist international society is ‘about the creation of consensual beliefs across 
international and world society’ (Buzan, 2014: 114). It is about the move beyond the coexistence 
among states into the realm of cooperation and convergence. Following this understanding, 
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contemporary international society already contains ‘very substantial elements of solidarism woven 
through its pluralist framing’ (Buzan, 2014: 130). More crucially, the practical progress towards 
solidarism of this nature has been made, Buzan (2014: 118) argues, mostly through the society of 
states, whether one looks at the case of the EU, or ‘around the debates and practices of democratic 
peace theory, economic liberalism, human rights and environmental stewardship’.  
 
For Buzan then, the site of solidarism is of paramount importance. Buzan’s state-centric solidarism 
does not insist on human-centric solidarity as a necessary condition and may not even necessarily be 
liberal in its value orientation. Where does cosmopolitan solidarism stand in relation to this state-
centric solidarism? Buzan’s reading is intriguing. Solidarist rhetoric, no doubt, draws upon 
cosmopolitan values of individual rights and a universal community of humankind. However, ‘under 
the existing conditions, states necessarily play a key role in implementing and defending 
cosmopolitan principles’. In short, ‘while cosmopolitan logic is the main moral impetus for the 
solidarist camp, state-centrism is the dominant practical theme’ (Buzan, 2014: 115). On this reading, 
Buzan makes one contestable claim, i.e. while the solidarist literature of the ES ‘may be motivated 
by an underlying cosmopolitanism, in practice it is almost all about state-centric solidarism’ (Buzan, 
2014: 132). This inherent unity between cosmopolitan solidarism and state-centric solidarism, Buzan 
(2014: 127) asserts, even finds strong expression in Wheeler (2000), for ‘although it is fair to say that 
Wheeler draws his normative force from cosmopolitan solidarism, his empirical analysis and policy 
prescriptions are firmly rooted in state-centric solidarism. He wants the state to take more 
responsibility to “save strangers”’.  
 
Buzan’s claim that states play an indispensable role in promoting solidarist values and in moving the 
society of state beyond pure co-existence finds strong resonance in Dunne and Hurrell. Dunne 
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(2008: 279) seems to have lent his support to Buzan’s notion of state-centric solidarism, when he 
observes that ‘the development of world society institutions is dependent on the ideational and 
material support of core states in international society’. Hurrell (2007: 75) is explicit that ‘the dense 
institutional core that formed the heart of really-existing liberal solidarism in the post-1945 period 
was intimately connected with the relationship that linked the United States with its Cold War allies 
and partners in the Greater West’. Reflecting upon the development of human rights regimes in the 
post-1945 period, Hurrell (2007: 149) suggests that ‘the road to common humanity lies through 
national sovereignty’, since international human rights regimes have affected political actors 
‘primarily on an interstate level and in terms of dynamics of the interstate system.’  The crucial 
difference, though, is that whereas Buzan is keen to locate the evolving solidarism empirically and 
firmly in the society of states as it has practically developed, Hurrell and Dunne are more interested 
in whether the normative ambition of global international society informed by liberal cosmopolitan 
values is moving pluralist international society to and beyond the point of no return.    
 
The Yin-Yang of international society  
Buzan is scathingly critical of the perspective that regards pluralism and solidarism as alternative 
social forms of order, which are mutually exclusive in the evolution of international society. 
Pluralism and solidarism, he insists, are not ‘separate, zero-sum positions’, but ‘are two sides of an 
ongoing, and permanent, tension of the subject matter in International Relations around which the 
normative and structural debates of the English School are organized’ (Buzan, 2014: 86). They are 
‘interlinked sides in an ongoing debate about the moral construction of international order’ (Buzan, 
2014: 113). His analysis of the normative orientations of the ES focuses therefore on the linkage 
between pluralism and solidarism, with emphasis on their relationality rather than on their duality. 
In his words, ‘order/justice and pluralism/solidarism have yin/yang qualities in which each is a 
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necessary presence in the other’ (Buzan, 2014: 84), as ‘Yin and Yang never stand alone (Buzan, 2014: 
86).’ This is third move that Buzan takes to intervene in the pluralist/solidarist debate.   
 
Placing pluralism and solidarism in yin-yang relationality highlights the complicities that bind these 
two seemingly intractable opposites. Buzan’s assertion that solidarism can thrive in a state-centric 
international society, and his argument that despite its state-centrism, ‘there is also some place in 
pluralism for the great society of humankind’ (Buzan, 2014: 91) aim to show the co-implications of 
pluralism and solidarism as a particular social-relational dialectic in the evolution of international 
society. There is, in other words, some generative unity between the two. They are not only 
interdependent and interwoven, but also co-evolving and co-implicated. 
 
In Chinese philosophy, yin-yang is ‘a mode of thought which allows for infinite permutation’ 
(Schwartz, 1985: 366). Yin and yang ‘co-create, co-govern, and co-exercise power’, as they have 
equal valence (Ling, 2013: 560). As heuristics, yin-yang are helpful in ‘surfacing complicities within 
conflicts, as well as contradictions within complementarities’, thus identifying sources of imminent 
change and transformation (Ling, 2013: 563). Mapping yin-yang thinking onto the understanding of 
pluralism/solidarism debate, the question is no longer how to reconcile tensions and contradictions 
between the two, but rather how various strengths and weaknesses defining the relationship 
between pluralism and solidarism can be balanced to maximum effect, and when that relationship 
can be most productive and harmonious, leaving moral possibilities open in any given historical and 
social context. In Buzan’s (2014: 170) words, it is about ‘thinking normatively about the endlessly 
unfolding and changing problematique of how to get the best mix of order and justice under any 
given circumstances’. Through yin-yang co-evolving dialectical reasoning, not only ‘the voices of 
pluralism and solidarism have always been fully audible throughout the history of international 
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society’ (Bain, 2014: 166); but also pluralism is historically yang, i.e. morally progressive, and 
universalism, yin, i.e. morally conservative and politically reactionary in the evolution of 
international society. This is best illustrated by the establishment of the Westphalian system with 
the absolutist territorial state, dynastic diplomacy, and reliance on natural law, which was meant to 
undermine the universal political authority of the Papacy. 
 
How effective, then, are the three moves made by Buzan discussed above in rescuing the 
pluralist/solidarist debate from the excessive polarization and in removing the unnecessary heat in 
this debate? The introduction of yin-yang as a mode of thought in understanding the relationality 
between pluralism and solidarism in the evolution of international society has certainly created 
some space for wider debate. Buzan’s elaboration of state-centric solidarism as ‘some real evolution 
of international society towards more solidarist practices and institutions’ and his juxtaposition of 
state-centric and cosmopolitan solidarism (Buzan, 2014: 113-120) may prove controversial and 
purposively provocative in the ongoing debates and emerging research agendas for the ES. As Buzan 
(2014: 169) acknowledges, the pluralist/solidarist debate is ‘the normative heart of the English 
School’s conversation’. If Randall Collins (1998: 1) is right that ‘intellectual life is first of all conflict 
and disagreement’ and that ‘conflict is the energy source of intellectual life, and conflict is limited by 
itself’, the pluralist/solidarist debate is likely to remain at the centre of disagreement among ES 
scholars. For this very reason, it will also be at the forefront of the ES pursuit in producing creative 
and imaginative scholarship in future.  
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Solidarism, Pluralism and Fundamental Institutional Change 
Tonny Brems Knudsen, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. 
Keywords: English School; solidarism; pluralism; fundamental institutions 
 
Barry Buzan has written a splendid introduction to the English School as a theoretical approach to   
the study of international relations. It presents the general theory of international society and many 
of its tools in a way that is accessible and stimulating to students and scholars alike. This goes for the 
refined theoretical vocabulary, the eclectic but self-confident presentation of English School 
methodologies, the clear explanation of the difficult discipline of comparative historical states 
systems, the refreshing analytical approach to the key distinction between pluralist and solidarist 
ways of organizing international affairs, and the dynamic presentation of what the school sees as 
historically developed ‘fundamental’ or ‘primary’ institutions. 
 
What makes Buzan’s introduction particularly attractive is the space it opens up for further 
theoretical reflection and development. As a contribution to such further innovation this review will 
discuss two questions: First, how can primary institutions be open for change and yet continue to 
serve as pillars of modern international society? Second, what are the limits to solidarist 
international  change? 
 
Fundamental Institutional Change  
The notion of ‘primary institutions’ is a cornerstone in Buzan’s introduction to the English School as 
it was in his first comprehensive (2004) statement on English School theory. This is very much in line 
with the tradition. In their theory of international society, Martin Wight (1977: 129-152; 1978: 105-
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112), Hedley Bull (1977), Adam Watson (2009), Alan James (1973; 1978; 1986) among other classical 
exponents of the English School stressed the importance of what they thought of as the 
‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’ institutions of international society. More precisely, they referred to mutual 
recognition of sovereignty, the balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great-power 
management and (regulated) war (among others) as bases of meaningful interaction: institutions as 
sets of ‘habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’ (Bull, 1977: 74; see 
also  Suganami, 1983; Keohane, 1988; Wendt and Duvall, 1989; Evans and Wilson, 1992; Wæver, 
1998). They traced these institutions a long way back in history and their works strongly implied that 
without them, there would not be an international society or at least it would be a significantly 
different one. 
 
In ontological terms, such institutions are intersubjective understandings laid down in shared 
principles and practices which are constitutive of international order and international society as 
such. The relationship between state actors and primary institutions is mutually constitutive: 
Primary institutions are produced and reproduced by states over time; states participate in social 
and orderly interaction as sovereign actors with rights and duties on the basis of primary 
institutions. This is a logic of structuration (Wendt and Duval, 1989). Buzan (2014: 17) captures the 
durable and fundamental nature of primary institutions and their ontological status well with the 
argument that they are ‘constitutive of both states and international society in that they define not 
only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behavior in relations to each 
other, as well as the criteria for membership of international society’. At the same time his 
introduction to the school contains examples of fundamental institutional change, both historical 
and current. So, primary institutions can be subject to substantial change while they continue to 
function as bases of modern international society. This is a more precise and refined 
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conceptualization of primary institutions than earlier ones. But it also calls for further discussion and 
inquiry. 
Firstly, Buzan’s reconceptualization raises the question of the relative permanence of primary 
institutions. The argument that such institutions are durable, but not fixed (cf. also Buzan, 2004: 
181), is convincing and in line with earlier work, e.g. on the changing practices of the balance of 
power over time (Wight, 1977, 1978). Likewise, Bull (1977: xiv) argued that the absence of the UN 
would not mean the end of more fundamental institutions, though it would change their working or 
operation. In terms of fundamental institutional change Bull’s, and in some places also Wight’s, 
focus seem to be on the changing practices of primary institutions whereas Buzan’s (2004; 2014), 
Holsti’s (2004) and in some cases also Wight’s, goes further to include the possible disappearance of 
them as in the case of colonialism. 
 
However, institutions such as mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the 
balance of power and great-power management can hardly disappear without the disappearance of 
international society as such. These institutions are, historically and logically, an integrative part of 
the modern states system. Historically, they were taking shape long before the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia, meaning that they evolved simultaneously with the evolution of independent states and 
before the orderly aspects of the Holy Roman Empire had vanished (Wight, 1977). Divine law gave 
way to natural law and positive law. Mutual recognition and diplomacy between kings and princes 
began under the waning authority of the Roman pope and Emperor. The balance of power and 
great-power management were evolving as institutional practices in the Middle Ages. Due to these 
primary institutions there has, in fact, never been a ‘naked’ states system in the realist sense (James, 
1993). Logically, an international society can hardly exist without mutual recognition of sovereignty, 
diplomacy, international law and (more arguably) a balance of power and collective or unilateral 
great power management. 
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Though colonialism and slavery are institutions (or simply practices) that international society can do 
without, other institutions seem to be an indispensable and integrative part of modern international 
society. This indicates that fundamental institutional change is both about changes in the working of 
primary institutions and change in the fundamental architectural line up. Moreover, it indicates that 
we may distinguish between dispensable and indispensable primary institutions. Indispensable 
institutions are preconditions of international society as such, or possibly a particular version of it, 
e.g. solidarist international society.  
 
Secondly, a central question is hereby indicated: How can we conceive of fundamental institutional 
change if such institutions are preconditions of international society as such? How can primary 
institutions such as mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the balance of 
power and great power management be open for change, and then at the same time continue to 
serve as bases of international society and its elements of order and justice? The answer indicated in 
much English School work including Buzan’s is that the working of primary institutions can change 
over time while some basic conditions of international order or coexistence continue to be provided 
for. In an attempt to make sense of this I have suggested that institutional continuity is related to 
constitutive principles while fundamental institutional change is related to the associated practices: 
Institutional practices may change, the constitutive principles they support continue to be 
reproduced (Knudsen, 2013; 2014). Compare for instance the Cold War balance of power with that 
of the 19th century post-Napoleonic era. They look quite different – because the working of the 
balance of power were different in these historical periods, as a consequence of differences not only 
in polarity, but also in the practices associated with the balance of power in these two periods. The 
constitutive principle of the balance of power, namely that no one is in a position to lay down the 
law to others, and the resulting one that imbalances must be adjusted in one way or another, were 
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upheld in both periods. But the central practices by which these principles were maintained and 
reproduced in the 19th century were those of a great-power concert, whereas rivalry, arms race, 
alliances and spheres of influence were the reproducing practices of the Cold War (Bull, 1977; Holsti, 
2004). Another example can be found in current great-power management which takes place under 
evolving multi-polarity. The great powers still use their preponderance for the maintenance of 
international order, but shifts between the associated practices of rivalry, balancing and concert are 
evident in humanitarian intervention and beyond (Knudsen, 2014). 
 
From these observations I suggest that we distinguish between the constitutive principles inherent 
in primary institutions and the range of practices by which they are reproduced. In this sense, a 
primary institution may be defined as (1) a (set of) constitutive principle(s) that make meaningful 
interaction possible, and (2) an associated set of practices by which the constitutive principles are 
reproduced at a given point in time, with (3) the combined effect of structuring the actions and 
interactions of states in a sociological rather than a deterministic sense. Consequently, institutional 
continuity is represented by the ongoing reproduction of one or more constitutive principles which 
are preconditions of meaningful interaction, while institutional change can be understood as (a) 
changes in the practices by which the constitutive principles are reproduced or maintained (= change 
in a primary institution), or in rare cases, (b) changes in the constitutive principles themselves (= 
change of a primary institution) (Knudsen, 2013). 
 
These suggestions are not in opposition to Buzan’s, but rather complementary to them. But thinking 
in terms of the model outlined above may involve some extra gains. Firstly, it allows us to specify 
fundamental institutional continuity and change and their relationship more closely: fundamental 
institutional continuity can be thought of as the ongoing reproduction of constitutive principles that 
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make international society as such possible, while fundamental institutional change can be thought 
of as changes in reproducing practices, and, in rare cases, change in the constitutive principles 
themselves. Needless to say, this has to be exposed to and applied in close empirical studies, which 
echoes the call from Wilson (2012) for a grounded approach. Secondly, it allows us to distinguish 
between principles and practices as the key elements of primary institutions. Thirdly, it allows us to 
theorize the relationship between primary and secondary institutions, where the former makes the 
latter possible while the latter offers essential reproduction of fundamental principles and practices 
and often also designed or evolved changes in the reproducing practices. Fourthly, it underlines the 
potential of fundamental institutional analysis as a key to understanding contemporary changes in 
world order including presently the changing practices of great-power management mentioned 
above and the politics of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).   
 
From Pluralist to Solidarist Institutions?  
Buzan’s dynamic treatment of primary institutions has important ramifications for another 
cornerstone in the English School theory of international society, namely the distinction between 
pluralism and solidarism which he sets out to deconstruct and reformulate. As pointed out by Buzan 
(2014: 86), Hedley Bull (1966) originally presented these as two competing streams of thought in the 
history of ideas, as well as two alternative models for the organization of international society. 
Pluralism was derived from legal positivism and the political theory of, among others, Mill and 
Burke. Accordingly the minimum requirements of international order such as mutual respect of 
sovereignty, non-intervention, positive international law and tolerance of differences (each state 
must decide for itself what ‘the good life’ is) were conceived as the basic organizational principles of 
international society (Bull, 1966: 52-53, 67-68; Jackson, 2000). Solidarism was derived from the 
Grotian internationalist thinking of especially Hugo Grotius and Hersch Lauterpacht. Accordingly, 
conditional sovereignty, a combination of natural (or progressive) and positive international law, 
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human rights, collective security, collective enforcement of common principles (by means of 
international organization and international courts of justice), and the reservation of the use of force 
for the common good were conceived as the basic organizational principles of international society 
(Bull, 1966: 52; Lauterpacht, 1946/1975: 307-365 (esp. 354-358); Lauterpacht, 1925/1977: 398). 
 
Bull also indicated that there was a choice to make for states between the pluralist and solidarist 
conception of international society. Though he had sympathy for the solidarist conception of 
international society, he was clearly skeptical towards it, because he saw a fundamental 
contradiction between pluralist principles for the maintenance of international order and solidarist 
principles for the pursuit of human justice. Under the divisive conditions of the Cold War, solidarist 
principles were likely to undermine ‘those structures of the system, which might otherwise be 
secure’ (Bull, 1966: 70). 
  
As it has been increasingly recognized, however, pluralism and solidarism are not mutually exclusive 
theoretical and normative positions, or mutually excluding conceptions of international society. They 
should rather be seen as endpoints on a continuum with many possible combinations, or as two sets 
of principles and institutions which can be (and historically have been) combined and mixed in the 
political organization of international society (Knudsen, 1999: 12-17, 72, 74-82, 89-90, 403-407; 
Knudsen, 2002: 21-26; Buzan, 2004: 45-50; 56-57; de Almeida, 2006; Weinert, 2011). Buzan (2014: 
16, 83-87, 89-167) goes further in an attempt to explain the energizing and sometimes sharp debate 
between the solidarist and pluralist positions as well as the room for solidarist change in 
contemporary international society. This is done on the basis of the distinction between state-
centric and cosmopolitan solidarism. State-centric solidarism is about the potential and actual 
cooperation among states beyond the minimum requirements of international order, for instance 
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about the solving of common problems such as climate change, market failure and poverty as well as 
the promotion of values like human rights on an intergovernmental (and thus state-controlled) basis. 
In this version of solidarism, states are simply using and reforming the rules and institutions of 
international society with a view to wider or more ambitious forms of cooperation (Buzan, 2014: 
116). Cosmopolitan solidarism is about ‘a disposition to give moral primacy to “the great society of 
humankind”, and to hold universal, natural law, moral values as equal to or higher than the positive 
international law made by states’ (Buzan, 2014: 118). In this way humankind becomes a moral 
referent against which to judge the behavior of states and take international society towards more 
progressive, just and stable positions (Williams, 2010). 
  
This is a helpful refinement of the classical distinction which paves the way for a number of valuable 
points. Firstly, Buzan (2014: 118-120) shows how cosmopolitan solidarism (much like liberal 
utopianism) has sometimes become a position against which pluralist writers have been able to 
sharpen their own arguments concerning the importance of the long-standing institutional bases of 
international order. Secondly, he argues that as a consequence of this, pluralist writers have at times 
been attacking a philosophical abstraction rather than a radical proposal for progressivist change. 
Thirdly, he argues with reference to state-centric solidarism that ‘the main thrust of solidarism in the 
English School debates is much more about how to make solidarism work within the society of states 
than, as Bull would have it, necessarily being revolutionist in the sense of setting out to replace the 
society of states’ (Buzan, 2014: 134). Buzan thus argues that parts of the solidarist project are 
compatible with the pluralist one in so far that they are fundamentally state-based. The product of 
these points is captured nicely by the formulation that ‘while cosmopolitan logic is the main moral 
impetus for the solidarist camp, state-centric solidarism is the dominant practical theme’ (Buzan, 
2014:116). In this perspective state-centric solidarist change is possible and likely while 
cosmopolitan solidarism remains valuable, though primarily as a moral standard and aspiration.  
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In my view, the former argument is highly convincing as it can be backed with theoretical logic and 
historical evidence. The latter, however, calls for further discussion and qualification. More precisely, 
I would argue that principles and institutions associated with cosmopolitan solidarism by Buzan are, 
theoretically and empirically, also possible in contemporary international society, in spite of its 
ongoing pluralist bases. The key question here is whether individuals can be subjects of rights and 
duties under international law in their own right and whether such rights and duties would be 
fundamentally at odds with pluralist international society, as indicated by Buzan (119-120): 
 
The view that pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive rests on an argument over whether 
primacy of right is to be allocated to individuals or to states. If one takes the reductionist view that 
individual human beings are the prime referent for rights, and that they must be subjects of 
international law, carrying rights of their own, then this necessarily falls into conflict with the view 
that the claim of states to sovereignty (the right to self-government) trumps all other claims to 
rights. Either individual human beings possess rights of their own (subjects of international law) or 
they can claim and exercise rights only through the state (objects of international law). 
 
However, the first question regarding individuals as subjects of international law was settled a long 
time ago to the advantage of the cosmopolitian solidarist conception of international society. As 
argued by Lauterpacht (1937; 1946; 1950) the laws of war made the individual a subject of 
international law before and after World War II with rights and duties of their own under 
international humanitarian law e.g. The Hague and Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Genocide 
Convention (see Roberts and Guelff , 2000; Weller, 2002). Moreover, these rights and duties were 
enforced in the post-World War II war crimes tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. Lauterpacht (1946; 
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1950) also saw human rights as something that turned individuals into bearers of rights and duties in 
their own right, and this view was substantiated with the adoption of the two 1966 human rights 
conventions, and thus the move toward genuine international human rights law.  
 
Since then the codification of rights and duties of the individual and the establishment of principles 
and institutions for the enforcement of these rights and duties have continued. The most important 
of these developments is the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the realization of the Court itself in 2002. Today, individuals and groups of individuals have 
rights (of protection in times of war and peace) and duties (not to commit such crimes) under 
international humanitarian law, and these can be enforced at the ICC. This can, under certain clearly 
specified circumstances, even take place when criminal prosecution is resisted by the home state of 
the perpetrators of such crimes (Weller, 2002).  
 
The development of a practice of humanitarian intervention at the UN in the 1990s and the adoption 
of the R2P at the 2005 UN World Summit is another example of the move towards enforcement of 
humanitarian principles in the rules and machinery of international society. The prevention of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is not unproblematic, and it still depends very 
much on the will of states indicating state-centric solidarism in Buzan’s terms. But international 
society now has at its disposal a set of principles and practices – meaning arguably a primary 
institution (Knudsen, 1997; 1999; 2013) – for the potential prevention of mass atrocity crimes 
against minorities and peoples, indicating a move towards cosmopolitan solidarism in Buzan’s terms. 
 
The rights and duties of the individual, under international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law, have been agreed on by states but they belong to the individual as a matter of 
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law. Individuals are bearers of rights and duties in their own right as subjects, not objects, of 
international law. Not above states, not subordinate to states, but alongside states! Buzan (2014: 
117) sees this as an extension of state sovereignty, but it goes much further.   
 
The second question concerning cosmopolitan solidarism - whether such rights and duties of the 
individual would be subversive to international order - is far from settled, but international society 
now has the machinery for the enforcement of the rights and duties of individuals and this has been 
organized precisely by means of a well-considered balance and combination of pluralist and 
solidarist principles, namely the complementary court system under the Rome Statute, and the dual 
‘responsibility to protect’ of states and international society as represented by the UN and the UN 
Security Council. States have the primary responsibility to prosecute or protect under the ICC and 
R2P, but if they fail, states can be overruled by the ICC or the UN Security Council and the rights and 
duties of individuals or groups of individuals can be enforced against the will of the government 
which has, or whose citizens have, violated international humanitarian law. 
 
In spite of their cosmopolitan solidarist foundations, humanitarian intervention and international 
criminal jurisdiction are not ideas, principles and practices that take pluralism and solidarism into a 
dead end of mutual exclusion. On the contrary, they are contemporary and historical institutions 
showing how sovereignty, international humanitarian law and minority protection can be organized 
as parallel and integrated sets of rules and institutions (Knudsen, 1997; 1999; 2000; 2013; 2013a). 
Occasionally, this gives rise to quite a lot international tension and confrontation as evident in the 
recent great-power disputes over humanitarian intervention in Libya and Syria, or the African 
critique of the ICC. However, pluralist principles like the sanctity of borders and non-intervention, 
and firmly established solidarist institutions like the collective security system of the UN, are also 
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sometimes violated and subject to great-power disputes and political failure (e.g. the recent 
international crisis over Ukraine) without any serious consideration that they should be abandoned. 
Rules and institutions are important, and they will therefore recurrently be the subject of political 
disputes.  
 
The post-Cold War revival of humanitarian intervention and international criminal jurisdiction show 
that in practice genuine solidarist change is possible in a simultaneously pluralist international 
society. These may be taken to be primary institutions of a more solidarist international society, 
arguably along with international trusteeship which is more solidarist (Knudsen and Laustsen, 2006) 
than paternalist (Jackson, 2000; Bain, 2003) in the informal UN based model that was developed in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor in the 1990s and 2000s. The constitutive principles of these three 
solidarist primary institutions are that there must be a response to mass atrocities in the machinery 
of international society, that impunity is not acceptable in international society, and that 
international society has at least some responsibility for peoples living under war-torn or chaotic 
conditions (Knudsen, 2013). As argued by Buzan (2004; 2014: 130) and Jackson (2000) other 
solidarist institutions of a more state-centric kind are also emerging, among them environmental 
stewardship. To these can be added state-centric solidarist principles and practices in primary 
institutions normally considered to be pluralist including the market, international law, diplomacy 
and war (Buzan, 2014: 136-139, 147-153; see also Knudsen 2013; 2014). 
 
As it should be evident by now, I do not want Buzan to abandon the argument about the dynamic, 
flexible and changeable relationship between pluralist and solidarist principles, but to take it further, 
meaning beyond state-centric solidarism. Cosmopolitan solidarism as rights and duties of the 
individual under international law is already a fact and so is the move to collective enforcement 
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based on international organization and international criminal jurisdiction. The fundamental 
institutional structure of present-day international society is constitutive of both pluralist and (state-
centric and cosmopolitan) solidarist interaction. In my view, humanitarian intervention, international 
criminal jurisdiction and modern international trusteeship confirm rather than challenge Buzan’s 
argument about the practical entanglement of pluralist and solidarist rules and institutions over 
time. 
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Some might baulk at the notion that Barry Buzan singlehandedly, or with one or two others, 
‘reconvened’ the English School (Buzan, 2001; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 4, 12, 38). Was it ever 
disbanded?  Does this notion not confuse an informal school of thought with a more formal body 
such as a committee? As initially conceived by Roy Jones (1981), the English School was a loose 
collection of scholars identifiable by their commitment to a certain concept, international society, 
and their common institutional home in the Department of International Relations at the LSE.  In 
later accounts (e.g. Dunne, 1998) this conception was confused with the British Committee on 
International Theory set up in 1959 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and chaired by 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. While sharing some important common members the two 
entities are far from synonymous, and the terminological awkwardness of ‘reconvening’ a ‘school’ is 
but one consequence of the common tendency to confuse them. In terms of a fairly loose, if not 
geographically, collection of scholars sharing the same broad outlook and driven by certain common 
scholarly concerns, the English School, if not yet in name, was already well established by the time 
the British Committee first met. The British Committee is best seen not as the cradle of the English 
School but an important early institutional manifestation (Knudsen, 2000; 2001). This not-entirely-
pedantic point out of the way it can be stated without fear of contradiction that Buzan has played a 
major role in re-energising the school and giving it a disciplinary presence and identity that it did not 
enjoy even during its putative heyday in the 1960s and 1970s. In the market jargon of today it has 
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‘instant brand recognition’, and this is largely due to the energy, commitment and resolve of Buzan 
on a wide range of fronts. The English School now has working-group or ‘section’ status in a number 
of International Relations (IR) professional associations. English School panels feature regularly and 
prominently at international conferences. But his chief contribution is the steady stream of papers 
and monographs produced since he first began to work on the subject in the early 1990s.  
 
An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach is Buzan’s 
latest offering. It is a work that stands in a long line of English School texts in which the mature 
scholar pulls together many years of reflection on a broad and demanding subject. As with those 
earlier works it will have wide appeal, combining a lucid introduction for the relative beginner with a 
thorough stocktaking for the more advanced student of what has been done and what remains to be 
done within the school’s rubric. With regard to the latter Buzan suggests some interesting lines of 
theoretical development. Unlike some of its forerunners, one thinks immediately of Manning’s The 
Nature of International Society and Bull’s The Anarchical Society, it also provides a comprehensive 
guide to the literature.  
 
There is much to admire in this volume. Firstly, it provides a nice definition of the school (p. 8): what 
was first a club of like-minded predominantly English theorists and historians concerned with the 
normative basis of international order, became over time a geographically broad network of scholars 
engaged in a ‘great conversation’ about international/world society, the order/justice nexus, and 
solidarism/pluralism. This network draws heavily, though not slavishly, on a foundational literature, 
and it is broadly meliorist not idealist or utopian in approach (p. 30).  Of course one could argue that 
the English School was first a network before it became a club, if ever a club it was beyond our 
30 
 
disciplinary imagination. But the other elements in this definition will strike the English School 
cognoscenti as sound. 
 
Secondly, as well as conventionally highlighting the importance of international society the volume 
elevates to the English School conceptual pantheon the concept of raison de système, a concept first 
put forward by Adam Watson in his principal work The Evolution of International Society (2009) as 
the English School’s counterpoint to realist raison d’etat. More than anything else this sets apart 
English School thinking from those branches of realism which it is sometimes erroneously equated. 
Not only do the theorists themselves have a strong sense of raison de système—Kissinger and 
Morgenthau among others have/had that—but they conceive it as a powerful though not 
determining behavioural logic of states. It is the logic of ‘it pays to make the system work’ as Watson 
(2009: 14) put it, among other things by participating in shared institutions such as diplomacy, the 
balance of power, and international law. States often act and justify their actions in terms of raison 
d’etat, but by the same token they often arrive at their conception of raison d’etat by reference to 
their understanding of systemic requirements. States generally define their interests not against the 
system but in terms of the general rules and agreements that individually restrain and, in so doing, 
collectively benefit them.  
 
Thirdly, the volume provides a valuable analysis of the disjuncture between hegemony and 
sovereign equality in contemporary international society. As argued by Watson (2007, 2009) 
hegemony is a staple feature of international life. Indeed with his pendulum metaphor he comes 
close to positing that a mechanism is at work in international life, with hegemony occupying the 
midpoint at the bottom of the arc of the pendulum’s swing between the two ‘theoretical absolutes’ 
of absolute independence of states and absolute empire (Watson, 2009: 13-23, 319-25). This 
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mechanical concept contrasts sharply with that of others who see hegemony as a social institution, 
actual or potential (Clark, 2009, 2011). This not insignificant English School disagreement aside, few 
would dispute Watson’s contention that hegemony, or the existence of a small number of 
competing regional hegemonies, is the normal condition of the system. But the de facto position of 
hegemony sits uneasily with the de jure position of sovereign equality, a general and for some vague 
principle, but no less important for that. But this disjuncture creates problems for legitimacy, and 
problems for legitimacy in the English School reckoning spell problems for order. The problem is not 
easily solved in theory, even less so in practice. Retreat to a more pluralistic order in which sovereign 
equality might remain an aspiration but ceases to be a principle that daily informs practice is one 
remedy. Advance to a more solidarist order in which the practice of hegemony becomes heavily 
circumscribed, normatively and practically, is another. But neither remedy is as simple as it first 
appears. This is because, in Buzan’s view, they are not separate but ‘interlinked sides in an ongoing 
debate about the moral construction of international order’ (p. 113). While the pluralist/solidarist 
distinction might be central to English School thinking, Buzan insightfully suggests that in practice 
international society is never one or the other. Rather, a creative tension between them is at its very 
heart. Indeed, Buzan contends they have ‘yin/yang qualities in which each is a necessary presence in 
the other’ (p. 84).  
 
Fourthly, in a debate often shrouded in misunderstanding, Buzan makes a helpful distinction 
between two types of solidarism, state-centric and cosmopolitan (pp.114-120). Critics of solidarism, 
both within and without the English School, have generally attacked the latter type, seeing 
solidarism as the desire to transcend the states-system. Buzan shows, however, that English School 
solidarists are in fact much more moderate and pragmatic, motivated by cosmopolitan values, but in 
practice seeking merely to move international society beyond a basic logic of coexistence. It is true 
that they have over-focused on the issue of human rights vs. state sovereignty, in the process 
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disguising the degree of state-centric solidarism, understood as collective or global governance, that 
has developed, for example, in the economic sector: through the IMF, the World Bank, the G8, G20, 
and the spread more generally of the ideas, values and institutions of liberal capitalism (pp. 120, 
136-9). (It should be noted, of course, that other understandings of solidarist international society, 
such as help and assistance to economically weaker states, have been served less well by the spread 
of liberal capitalism). But even in the human rights sector the English School predilection has been 
not to abandon international society but to broaden and deepen the degree of cooperation and the 
scope for common action within it, i.e. not to downgrade the predominant position and role of 
states but to enhance their collective capability. 
 
Finally, the volume contains many astute and perceptive observations on the current state of 
international relations. In common with many general works of theory, much of the analysis is highly 
abstract. But in the practical spirit of the English School the theory is always the servant of greater 
‘real world’ understanding. Buzan usually finds a way of bringing even the most star-bound 
conceptual scheme down to ground. Thus, embedded in abstract analysis of actual and potential 
primary institutions such as the market or democracy we find such insights as: ‘The price of living 
with a global market … [is] the need to engage in a continuous learning process about how to adapt 
to, and stabilize, the ever unfolding challenges it generate[s]’ (p. 137); and, democracy may be an 
emergent and not fully-fledged institution but it ‘has enough clout as an international norm to make 
authoritarian regimes feel existentially challenged’ (p. 161). With such insights we encounter the 
trademark wisdom of the mature scholar, but also the power of integrated analysis, the skillful 
bringing together of the empirical and the theoretical, the abstract and the concrete. 
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But these and other strengths of the book should not disguise a number of weaknesses. Some of 
these are minor and fairly easily rectified. For example, many will agree with Buzan’s 
characterization of the contemporary school as a post-club network. The understanding of it as a 
club, however, tends to seep back in here and there. Thus Buzan asserts that the English School 
today ‘retains a strong but far from dominant position in British IR’ (p. 11). Can a network be ‘strong’ 
or ‘dominant’? The club idea seems to be informing this sentence. Similarly he contends that the 
‘the English School certainly deserves the brickbats it has received for not having been rigorous 
enough in defining its terms’ (p.25). But the writings of Bull, Vincent, James and Jackson are 
peppered with definitions. Hedley Bull wrote his undergraduate dissertation at Sydney University on 
‘Definition’ and as Vincent says ‘never got out of the habit’ (Vincent, 1990: 42). The issue here seems 
to be not so much rigour of definition as agreement on definition among the members. But why 
should a network agree? Here Buzan’s network is being tested by a standard more appropriate to a 
club. 
 
A second example concerns Buzan’s use of E. H. Carr as a foil for what he contends is most 
distinctive and in some cases most valuable about the school. Buzan’s case for differentiating the 
English School from realism (pp. 26-9) is subtle and persuasive. But in the process of making it he 
presents an image of Carr as a common-or-garden realist that is dated and, except for a nice 
footnote on Carr’s ‘double anti-liberalism’ (p. 190), insensitive to the findings of the extensive 
revisionist scholarship on Carr  (see e.g. Jones, 1998; Cox, 2000; Wilson, 2013; Molloy, 2013). This is 
a fairly big subject but in brief Buzan confuses Carr’s use of realism as a weapon for attacking those 
he does not like, predominantly liberals of one kind and another, with Carr’s position on 
international relations in toto.  For Carr international society amounted to far more than ‘a self-
interested epiphenomenon of great power politics’ (p. 32). Indeed in his desire to strike a balance 
between power and morality, and arrive at a common understanding of what is ‘right and 
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reasonable’ in international affairs, Carr’s conception is not far removed from an English School 
conception. Indeed it could be argued that Carr’s conception is more solidarist, more precisely (and 
with gratitude to Buzan) state-centric solidarist, than pluralist. He viewed the future of international 
relations in terms of a set of regional solidarisms, pushed on by industrial and capitalist modernity 
(Wilson, 2001). This chimes, indeed, with a number of themes Buzan develops later in his book, 
which makes one think that rather than a realist foil Carr could have been better and more 
sensitively employed as an insightful early protagonist of the kind of argument regarding current 
trends and the future of international society that Buzan wishes to make—essentially English School 
plus globalization. In addition, Buzan contends that even in the area of great power management 
where realism and the English School have much in common, a significant difference exists with 
‘realists such as Carr emphasizing the self-interest of great powers in “managing” the international 
society, and the English School emphasizing raison de système’ (p. 29). I am not sure this is the case. 
Could not all Carr says about the need to balance power with morality, reduce to a minimum 
unnecessary force and violence, and the vital importance of peaceful change, represent an attempt 
to identify and strengthen raison de système (see e.g. Carr, 1939: 264-84, 302-07)? I am not here 
supporting the claim that Carr should be seen as a member of the English School (see e.g. Dunne, 
1998: 12-13), but he could certainly be seen as a forerunner and ideational resource for some of its 
more progressive elements (see e.g. Dunne, 1998: 23-46). 
 
There are, however, some shortcomings less easily rectified. Indeed, they relate to the brand of 
English School scholarship that here and in other writings Buzan develops. Relative beginners and 
even some advanced students need to be aware of the dangers of hitching the school to the work 
and reputation of one, albeit prominent, scholar—Buzan today as it was Bull in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Around a core set of ideas and problematics the school permits considerable diversity of style, focus 
and approach. Indeed, its academic pluralism not to say oecumenicalism is often held out as one of 
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its main attributes. Given this it is important to stress that Buzan’s brand of English School theory is 
in some respects heterodox; so much so that some early English School contributors do not see it as 
English School at all, though it is certainly developed logically if inevitably selectively from the wealth 
of ideas contained within the foundational literature. 
 
There are two related points I want to make in this connection. The first concerns the missing 
chapter in Buzan’s volume. It is entitled ‘The English School and the History of Ideas’. It is an 
important chapter because the English School has contributed more to this subject than any of the 
other major IR schools and traditions. Buzan mentions Bull et al on Grotius, Keene on Grotius, 
Wights ‘3 R’s’. But to these should be added Bull on Kelsen, Wight’s Four Seminal Thinkers, Vincent 
on Hobbes, Vincent on Burke, Hurrell on Kant, Sharp on Butterfield, Navari’s recent collection on 
‘public intellectuals’, not to mention Wilson on Woolf, Wilson on Murray. The list is a long one. All of 
these studies have a broad educational purpose, and can be conceived as extending into a 
sometimes narrow and presentist field the tradition and philosophy of liberal learning. It is a good in 
itself to know what great minds thought in the past and with what effects. But these studies also 
have the more practical aim of enriching, clarifying, and putting into historical perspective current 
thinking and concerns. They are geared to past understanding as a good in itself but also as a means 
to current end, deepening and sharpening current thought. For this reason it is no accident that the 
major studies of non-intervention, nationalism, and sovereignty within the English School all employ 
in large part a history of ideas approach (see e.g. Vincent, 1974; Mayall, 1990; Jackson, 2007). The 
point is that if the English School is a ‘great conversation’, as Buzan frequently depicts it, then part of 
what makes it great is dialogue with the past—keeping alive, reflecting on, reordering and putting 
into a new light past ideas. All with an eye on the present. The English School has been remarkably 
good at this, though one would not glean this from Buzan’s latest pages. 
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The second point concerns a dimension of English School thinking that has received considerable 
attention in the last decade, not least from Buzan: primary institutions. Despite all the attention 
some fairly fundamental problems remain. Indeed, early in his discussion Buzan acknowledges that 
there may be problems with ‘how to theorize primary institutions’ (p. 80), by which he largely means 
how to go about determining their existence. Yet the main body of the book on pluralism and 
solidarism (Chapters 6-9) proceeds as if there existence is unproblematic. But we then learn in the 
final chapter that their existence is indeed problematic, at least to the extent that there is a vigorous 
debate on how to empirically ground them (pp. 173-8). Be this as it may, Buzan’s confidence in the 
existence of primary institutions is generally high, even with regard to some new candidates for 
institutional status. He says, for example, that ‘human inequality was certainly... a primary 
institution during this [pluralist] historical period’ (p. 108). To which it may be responded, it was 
certainly a widespread Western (and not only Western) assumption, but why this more grand thing a 
‘primary institution’? Why should it be considered more of an institution than, say, mercantilism or 
the right to proselytize? And with regard to the right to proselytize, the Christian dimension of 
Buzan’s ‘expansion story’ is almost entirely absent; nineteenth-century empire was not only about 
Western modernity, but the spread of the Christian faith. Moving into the twentieth century Buzan 
says that ‘there can be no doubt that human equality is now widely and deeply accepted as an 
institution of international society’ (p. 160). To which it may be responded, it might be a widely and 
even deeply accepted general principle (though one wonders sometimes about the depth), but why 
an ‘institution’? In addition, Buzan talks of the ‘relatively late arrival of nationalism to the pantheon 
of primary institutions’ (p. 110). But how do we know when a primary institution has arrived? At 
what point does an idea, principle, norm, or collection thereof, become an institution? It seems to 
me that the problem here is not at root conceptual—definitions of institutions, norms, principles, 
and the like abound—but empirical; and by empirical I have in mind not only or even mainly material 
facts but interpretive and social facts. That is, how people, or the relevant people, think, feel, 
perceive, understand. What are their social assumptions, standards and expectations? How can we 
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construct the ‘thought-world’ of the relevant actors and what the Sprouts called their 
‘psychomilieu’? Without detailed exploration of questions such as this all we have to fall back on is 
intelligent guesswork. On this problem and a potential resolution to it I have set my ideas elsewhere 
(Wilson, 2012) and there is no need to recount them here. The point about Buzan’s analysis of 
institutions is that although highly impressive and thought-provoking it remains highly abstract, 
more in the spirit of neorealism, or perhaps more broadly the neo-neo debate, than the English 
School. Where it could be asked are the people in Buzan’s institutions? Where are the quotes from 
the likes of Kissinger, Churchill, Roosevelt, Wilson, Cobden, Jefferson, de Tocqueville, Richelieu, and 
a host of lesser diplomatic celebs that animate earlier English School writings, especially those of 
Wight, Bull, Jackson and Vincent? Admittedly, these writers were not especially systematic in the 
gathering of their interpretive data; and of course allowances have to be made for different styles of 
writing, different types of research, differing interests and emphases. But with a subject such as 
primary institutions can we do without interpretive data of at least some kind? Until it is gathered 
and utilized one suspects that, like so much neorealist and/or neoliberal analysis, the study of the 
institutional structure of international society will remain plausible on the abstract plane, but its lack 
of concreteness will leave many beyond the walls of the English School unconvinced.  It will also 
retain this people-less rather mechanical quality—an odd thing for a ‘societal approach’. 
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In writing this introduction to the English School, Barry Buzan (Buzan, 2014) has performed a great 
service for those who identify with the School and for those discovering it for the first time. It is 
fitting that Buzan should be the author, for no one has toiled harder than he at constructing the 
School and carving out a space for it within the wider canon of International Relations (IR). And it is 
fitting that the book should appear now when it has finally been established to the satisfaction of 
empiricists and inter-subjectivists alike that the English School actually exists. We know this, because 
it enjoys an entry in the index of just about every example of that great gravy train, the American 
introductory IR text. True, it may occupy a corner seat in the ‘other approaches’ compartment of the 
theory carriage, dutifully, but inaccurately, presented as Realism-lite and then discarded. And true, 
the other occupants may still find conversation with it difficult, unsettled as they often are by its way 
of making them feel at the same time both dumber and smarter. Nevertheless, the English School is 
on the train. For those of us who have labored for years in an academic world dominated by a strong 
consensus about what count as problems, methods, arguments, and solutions, this is a source of 
great relief for which we owe Buzan, more than anyone else, much thanks.  
 
As Buzan clearly intended, his introduction has been written to invite conjectures, refutations and 
commentaries on his account of the state of play. In this article, however, I will linger only briefly on 
the usual questions associated with an English School stocktaking exercise, for example, how well 
has the introduction done in establishing the English School’s existence, its origins, its present form, 
and its future direction.  It is still great fun to revisit discussions of who was present at the creation, 
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discussions which rumble on even as those involved maintain it is not particularly important. It is 
even more fun to talk those foundational figures still alive and to sift through private papers or the 
boxes in Cambridge and at the LSE. They provide rare and fascinating glimpses of an intellectual 
project emerging. However, multiple stories emerge. In my version, for example, I would emphasize 
the diversity of interests which characterized the deliberations of British Committee on the Theory 
of International Politics (BCTIP)—the English School’s precursor in some accounts of its history, an 
early institutional expression in others. Papers on the Macedonian system (Watson, 1972) and the 
liberal pedigree of diplomacy (Keens Soper, 1974), for example, rubbed shoulders with attempts to 
assess the significance of the defection of Lin Piao (Hudson, 1972) and the place of decolonization in 
the international system (Dorr, 1974). Roads not taken by the participants or anyone since abound. 
We have become familiar, for example, with Wight’s (1977) views on the underlying cultural unity he 
regards a being necessary for a states system, with Bull’s (1977) position that such a system can 
appear as a consequence of calculations of practical benefit by its participants, and with James’ 
(1993) claim that such systems appear as a logical and practical necessity when independent political 
units need to interact with one another. My English School story would emphasize Butterfield’s 
(1961) view that a states-system emerges when a common underlying culture is fragmenting.  
 
Tracing lineage and discussing who should be regarded as in or out is fun, albeit for fewer people as 
time passes. Stocking taking also seems to be in the English School’s genes (Dunne, 1998; Linklater 
and Suganami, 2006; Wilson, 2012; Suganami, 2014). It dates back, at least on the Cambridge front, 
to attempts at summarizing the deliberations of the BCTIP undertaken by Butterfield (1961; 1964). 
History and stocktaking have remained important for another reason, however, to demonstrate that 
the English School exists.  My purpose here, therefore, is to examine two questions. Why might it be 
thought a good idea to develop an English School; and what might possibly be some of the 
disadvantages of having done so?  In examining these questions, I will focus on the idea of an 
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academic school in its most mundane sense, that is to say, as a group of scholars seeking to give 
themselves and their ideas a collective identity institutionally expressed. I shall also assume that a 
school in this sense implies being a school among other schools and within a system or even society 
of schools which has rules about membership and appropriate conduct. Having dashed down the 
platform to catch the disciplinary train and having found our seat, it seems to me timely that we 
check our pockets to see if anything is missing or in danger of falling out 
 
Academic schools, like other collectives, may be seen as existing to make their members more 
secure and, if they are successful, to enhance their members’ reputations. While academia is no 
anarchy, it may be viewed in part as a structured arena of power politics populated by people who 
have an interest in their own professional survival and success. One of the ways to survive and 
prosper is to produce published research in a world where the number of opportunities to do so is 
always less than the number of people seeking to publish. A school of scholars with something in 
common about the way they approach their subject is assumed to exert far more influence on the 
grant providers, conference organizers, and publishers that create and control access to publishing 
than each of the scholars acting in isolation. To provide a concrete example, prior to the attempt to 
create of an English School Section of the North American-based International Studies Association 
(ISA) in 2000, the chances of what would be recognized as English School panels or individual papers 
being accepted for its annual convention were minimal. Once an English School Section was created, 
however, an automatic allocation of thirty papers became available. To get the section, however, the 
case had to be made that there was a group of scholars doing highly worthwhile things in similar 
ways but which, in the existing scheme of things, was not able to gain access to participation. With a 
section, the English School became a player competing for resources which rendered its members 
more secure and provided opportunities for extending their influence further. Helping to set up the 
English School Section of ISA, for example, contributed to my own promotion and, once established, 
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the section greatly expanded my prospects for acceptance onto the Convention’s annual program.  
Of course, the academic struggle for survival and thus for wealth, power, influence and status—both 
in the ISA case and in other competitions for academic resources—is mild compared to similar 
competitions in other walks of life. And the form of the struggle is primarily an intellectual one in 
which arguments are made, supported and critically evaluated. As we can see, however, particularly 
when the resource pile is shrinking or demands upon it are increasing, academia is no more immune 
than other walks of life from being tainted by politics and power, if not in the motives of those who 
make decisions, then in the consequences of those decisions in the eyes of those affected by them. 
In such conditions, to be in a group with shared interests and capabilities is better than acting alone.  
 
It cannot, of course, be any old group. Were this the case, then members of the English School could 
simply have joined other academic groups already in existence. There have to be some elements 
which the members discover and experience when they work with each other which they do not find 
elsewhere. The commonalities matter for a variety of reasons. Protestations about the need for 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary collaboration, bridge-building and reaching out across the 
divides notwithstanding, most people in IR like to associate with like. By this, I do not mean people 
who always agree with us so much as people who think about things in similar ways. Thus it is, for 
example, that I can understand, learn from and enjoy an English School argument which is moving in 
a direction with which I strongly disagree far more than I can a positivist demonstration of a 
proposition for which, in itself, I have more sympathy. However, the impulse to find, make, grow and 
enjoy being in our own little groups does not result in an atomized or radically plural academic 
world. Instead, the advantages of association provided by being in a school of like-minded people 
may lead to collaboration, and collaboration can lead to expansion of both the scope and the 
complexity of the investigations being undertaken. As a consequence, as a school develops there is a 
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tendency for its members to discover a need for collaboration and cooperation with the members of 
other schools.  
 
A number of consequences follow. First, there have to be basic rules about who can be a participant 
in these interactions. There are rules for interactions between groups, for example, about joint 
workshops or collaboration in the creation of shared panels. And there are internal rules about how 
a school or group maintains its own sense of itself through the processes of interacting with others. 
Thus, If an academic school wants to be a section of ISA—to get the panel allocation, for example, or 
to appear as a school in the Compendium reference work sponsored by the ISA (Denemark, 2010)—
then it must tailor itself to look like an ISA section with a charter, officers, meetings, and an 
acceptable account of its distinctive theoretical and methodological underpinnings. Elsewhere and 
to its members, the English School may present itself in looser, subtler and more complex terms. As 
a school among schools, however, the processes of schooling in which it must engage become 
instrumental in shaping the English School a particular way and locating it in a particular place in a 
broader intellectual scheme.   
 
Schools can be seen as institutional actors which establish and confirm the collective identity of their 
members while safeguarding and advancing their interests both as individuals and collectively. 
However, they also exist to make claims based upon their members’ investigations and reflections 
about how to understand aspects of the world in which they are interested. And on the basis of 
these claims, their members suggest courses of action which are likely to be wise or foolish in 
prudential terms, and good or bad in moral terms. Generally, but not necessarily, these claims are 
organized around challenging other understandings which are often presented as established or 
orthodox and, on the bases of the challenges, suggesting alternative and better ways of thinking and 
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acting. In short, schools exist for something, or to accomplish something beyond sustaining 
themselves and their members. This is where the English School becomes both interesting and 
problematic, for only with great difficulty can it be made to fit into conventional school talk and 
school games. 
 
These difficulties are illustrated by attempting to imagine other IR schools in the mundane sense in 
which I have presented the idea of schools and with which the English School rubs shoulders. The 
Realist School, for example, presents as a simple, purposeful racing scow, its small and disciplined 
crew intent upon maintaining their own course. They have arguments among themselves, of course, 
but they are of a navigational, rather than existential, sort. The tacks they impose upon themselves 
seem to take them further away from the shores on which most of us live, except on those rare 
occasions—defining moments in Waltzian terms—when their course brings them close in and they 
sweep by giving us all a good soaking to remind us of the importance of power politics. The Liberal 
School, in its American iteration at least, appears as a modern cruise ship pursuing a steady course in 
a single direction. If offers places for far more people—highly stratified it is true, but according to a 
rational deck-plan with plenty of stairs and ladders to higher decks with better menus, more space, 
and possibly even a seat at the captain’s table for those who are ambitious and prepared to be 
reasonable and supportive of his policies. Cruise ships cannot always see racing scows and hailing 
between the two is undertaken with great difficulty, but when they do actually see each other, they 
at least recognize each other as water craft. 
 
In these terms, the English School appears as a patched up houseboat which, when looked at from 
some angles at least, manages to have the shimmering outlines of a graceful Arthurian barge. It is 
always possible to hear the sounds of hammering and tearing up from within as the crew goes about 
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its self-appointed tasks. They can be heard raising basic and worrying (to the boating mind at least) 
questions of the sort ‘do we really need a transom?’ Ask members of the crew where the houseboat 
is supposed to be going and some will point in a direction but note that progress towards it is very 
slow, subject to setbacks, and may not be helped much by us all putting our feet over the stern and 
kicking. Nevertheless, they will maintain, this is the right thing to do. Others will suggest the boat is 
going nowhere in particular and that attempts to make it do so will stress what is of necessity a very 
weak hull with damaging consequences. Experience, they will say, allows reason to recognize rough 
and calm water, how to survive the former and enjoy the latter. Beyond that, however, there is not 
much new to say, although explaining this to those who would otherwise put everything at risk by 
rocking the boat turns out to be pretty much a full time job.  Still others will deny they are members 
of the crew or that there even is a boat at all. Ask who are members of the crew and some of them 
will answer that—in a sense—everyone is. The Realist racing scow, the Liberal cruise ship, and the 
English School houseboat itself have iterations in which they all appear as part of the houseboat, as 
the tensions between them are somehow presented as parts of its structure. 
 
Like the houseboat, the metaphor is becoming strained. My purpose in employing it is not to 
lampoon.  Up to a point, attempts at English School stocktaking capture for me everything that is 
attractive about the English School because they are so difficult to undertake and because in terms 
of conventional thinking about international relations and IR theory they throw up important and 
entertaining paradoxes. Buzan’s attraction to taxonomy, and for ‘the naming of the parts’, results in 
some very effective work in this regard (Buzan, 2004a). Even more effective is the way in which, 
once he has laid the cards out on the table in their conventional relationships to one another, he 
shuffles the pack. Recall, for example, how he springs upon us solidarism’s function in maintaining 
the integrity of sub-units, just when we have become used to its role in stories about the possible 
emergence and strengthening of a global society (Buzan, 2004). However, Buzan’s recent 
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introduction also captures the risks of undertaking description and taxonomy in a way which seeks 
to present the English School as a school among schools within a discipline or field of study. Creating 
a taxonomy of things thought about or discussed shades into a structuring of the complex ways in 
which these things may be related to one another which, in turn, shades into a presentation of the 
world or at least its ideational component. There is nothing inherently wrong with undertaking such 
an exercise and presenting it as one person’s account of how they see things and how they appear 
to be related. The pressures of ‘schooling’, however, nudge the exercise in the direction of coming 
up with something authoritative, comprehensive, and directional. The problem here is not so much 
one of capturing the English School in a specific form with which many of those associated with it 
might disagree. It is the idea of such a capture itself and acting upon it which seems at odds with 
what others associated with the School regard as its intellectual commitments and theoretical 
assumptions.  It is also undertaken without much of a payoff from those outside the English School 
who are invited to be introduced to it. My more positivist colleagues in the American political 
science department where I work, for example, would struggle with Buzan’s introduction and 
conclude that its characterization of methodological pluralism and its attempts to situate 
contradictory understandings, claims, and prescriptions as parts of a whole and existing in relation to 
one another, simply make no sense. 
 
Consider again Buzan’s great talent for shuffling the pack of ideas just as their positions in relation to 
one another have been established. For him, this presents a challenge. How are we to modify the 
structure of ideas which the taxonomy has suggested in order to incorporate this new possibility? 
We are challenged to get it right or, at least, more accurate. Another approach, however, also 
associated with the English School, would suggest the need for great skepticism about such a 
project.  In thinking and doing IR theory, it would maintain that the challenge is not to identify 
tensions, resolve contradictions and provide more coherent accounts of the world. Rather, it is to 
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identify the ambiguities, limitations and consequences of the ways in which both practitioners and 
theorists think about international relations. One gets this sense from the early papers of the old 
British Committee. They track the attempts of other people doing their best to make sense of 
international relations. They speak cautiously about exploring the possibility of whether 
conversations can be moved towards higher levels of generality, but the activity is speculative, 
tentative and not particularly self-conscious. They make their arguments, push the boat out in 
Butterfield’s phrase, let it go, and move on to other things. Their theorizing is lightly worn. Thus 
Wight is content with the notion that Christendom fades and a sovereign state system can emerge 
when people undergo a change of heart. Butterfield is prepared to allow for cupidity to wreck 
perfectly good ideas and Providence to rescue them. Even Watson’s and Bull’s more explicit 
attempts at developing structures, understanding their origins, and speculating about their futures 
have this tentative and highly individualistic quality about them. They do not build on others and do 
not appear to expect to be built upon. They produce interpretive reactions to what other people can 
see of international relations and attempt to grasp them, rather than building sites with cumulative 
potentials. In this sense, Bull and Watson’s(1984) edited collection of essays on the expansion of 
international society is not an early ground-breaking project lacking the coherence one might expect 
from a more mature stage in the development of a school’s research program.  Their juxtaposing of 
some widely different interpretations on a highly general theme, and their invitation to further 
reflections by other people is precisely, for some people, what the English School is all about. 
 
‘For some people’, of course, is the key here. The English School can present as many faces as there 
are people who identify with it. No amount of demarcating where it came from, where it is, and 
where ought to be going by those who like to build will change that for those who like to interpret. 
Equally, no amount of whistle-blowing by interpreters who protest that ‘you can’t do that!’ will 
prevent the builders from attempting to give their shapes to the whole. However, one of the great 
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things about the English School is that, were it to have conditions of membership, then joyfully 
accepting the tension between builders and interpreters as a permanent condition, rather worrying 
about it as a problem in need of a solution, would be one of them.  
 
In another stock-taking cum introductory collection of essays, Roger Epp (2014) notes how much has 
resulted from a few people trading papers and comments in a club-like atmosphere where the 
pressures to publish were minimal. The flight of Lin Piao, properly handled over tea and sherry, 
could quickly lead to considerations at the highest level of generality and, as it turns out, 
considerations of lasting significance, given that Lin Biao’s name, like Abou Ben Adhem’s, has 
reappeared on the angel’s list. Epp is undoubtedly correct in maintaining that these early exchanges 
of papers have had remarkable consequences. He is also correct when he suggests that it is no 
longer possible to reproduce those conditions, at least in a way with such widespread consequences. 
The relaxed but authoritative speculations of a privileged few have been replaced by myriads of local 
groups and global networks engaging in their own less relaxed speculations about all aspects of 
international relations. It is equally the case, however, that without Barry Buzan’s efforts in a very 
different world from the one in which the British Committee operated, the traditions of speculation 
and theorizing identified with the English School would be in a much weaker position. Important 
gains have been made by seeking the status of a school as I have defined it, and we have lost little so 
far in our dash down the platform to catch the disciplinary train. There are, nevertheless, things to 
worry about. Buzan notes the English School is the only theoretical approach which has its own 
section in the ISA. This may be a mixed blessing. Is it a bridgehead, an invitation to permanent 
marginalization, or a straitjacket which increases the pressure to come up with holistic accounts of 
what the English School is, and to respond to Finnemore-type (2001) challenges to specify 
international systems and societies in terms which end up satisfying hardly anyone? Now the gains 
of mundane schooling have been made, it is time to be a little less self-conscious and a little less 
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schooled, and to go about our work, allowing questions and puzzles to strike us, and our responses 
and investigations to take us where they will. If this results in what others can see as a broad yet 
coherent set of responses to things which they regard as important, then good. If not, then that is 
also good. For many of those associated with the English School, so long as they continue to 
encounter work which engages them with the puzzles presented by people who are both emotional 
and reasoning, and who want to live together and apart, and who argue over how to do this, then 
that will be English School enough. 
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Barry Buzan has placed primary institutions at the center of his understanding of the English School 
and has deployed them to mark what is distinctive about the approach, and how they may be used, 
both comparatively and functionally, as analytical devices for exposing the social aspects of 
international order. But it is the distinction between primary and secondary institutions that has 
proved especially enlightening, and the one that may even deliver the long-awaited causal theory of 
international order. His initiation of the distinction (Buzan 2004) began a remarkable process of 
theoretical development, that elaborated the English School notion of institutions, that related that 
notion to international organizations, and that has been taken up by fellow scholars in the English 
School tradition, who have posited not only functional and dynamic relations between them, but 
also specified models of the relationship—models, moreover, with causal properties. 
 
In the 2004 volume, Buzan drew on conventional institutional theory to draw a distinction between 
primary institutions, associated in the conventional literature with social practices such as marriage, 
baptism and fox hunts, and secondary institutions, which are social and political organizations such 
as universities, government bureaucracies and business enterprises. He related these to the English 
School understanding of institutions, the traditional English School scholars being concerned mainly 
with primary institutions. In other words, he identified Bull’s five institutions of international society, 
including diplomacy and sovereignty, as social practices and ‘primary institutions’ as understood in 
institutional theory. He assigned to liberal theory concern with secondary institutions, and observed 
that liberal institutionalists primarily direct their attention to secondary institutions in the form of 
international organizations and regimes. In his 2014 work he identifies the latter as: 
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the products of a certain types of international society (most 
obviously liberal, but possibly other types as well), … for the most part 
intergovernmental arrangements consciously designed by states to serve specific 
functional purposes. They include the United Nations, the World Bank, the World 
Trade Organization and the Nuclear Non-proliferation regime (p. 16). 
 
He places secondary institutions as a relatively recent invention, first appearing ‘as part of industrial 
modernity’ in the later decades of the nineteenth century. 
 
But Buzan does more that note a division of labour. He hints at a critical relationship that each 
‘school’ in its own way had hitherto routinely ignored, and that has to be taken into account when 
considering institutional development, particularly the development of secondary institutions. As he 
characterizes it in the present volume, ‘secondary institutions are reflective and supportive of 
primary ones, and their possibilities are constrained by the broader framing of primary institutions 
within which they necessarily operate’ (Buzan, 2014: 30). Secondary institutions not only reflect, but 
also support primary institutions, and they are necessarily constrained by the broader diplomatic 
framework that is created by primary institutions and practices. 
 
He also begins to develop a systemic theory of the relationship, calling on Hedley Bull’s distinction 
between constitutional principles, regulative norms and rules.  Barely understood or discussed in the 
traditional accounts, Bull (1977) posited a systematic relationship between constitutional principles, 
which Buzan identifies with primary institutions, and normative principles and rules, which Buzan 
identifies with secondary institutions. To recall those distinctions, Bull (1977: 65-76) framed his 
understanding of international relationships as social relationships within a functional conception of 
society. In his conception, human societies, of whatever sort, must be founded on understandings 
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about three issues: security against violence; observance of agreements; and property rights.  These 
will take the form of rules, of which Bull distinguished three sorts, operating at different levels: 
 
1. Constitutional normative principles, which are the foundations of a social order, and 
which set out the basic ordering principle of the society. With regard to the anarchical 
society he set out a number of ideal types as illustration (e.g. society of states, universal 
empire, state of nature, and cosmopolitan community). 
 
2. Rules of coexistence (sometimes called procedural rules), which set out the minimum 
behavioural conditions for society, and therefore hinge on the basic elements of society: 
limits to violence; establishment of property rights; and sanctity of agreements. 
 
3. Rules to regulate cooperation in politics, strategy, society and economy. About these Bull 
(1977: 70) says: ‘Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the 
elementary or primary goals of international life, but rather to those more advanced or 
secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has 
been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence'. 
 
This schema recalls the idea of a legal system, developed by both Kelsen and Hart, from which it was 
most likely derived. According to the idea of a legal system, a complete legal order will have three 
forms of rules. First, it will have constitutive principles, which create ‘legal facts’ such as the 
constitutive principles of a liberal democracy (that give rise, for example, to the institutions of a 
representative democracy). Secondly, it will have procedural rules—Bull’s ‘rules of coexistence’—
with reference to liberal orders e.g. a bill of rights. Thirdly, it will have instructions for the ‘rule 
carriers’ on how to perform their roles.  
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In Bull’s schema it is fairly clear that in his category of regulatory rules (and possibly also procedural 
ones) he intended the placement of secondary institutions. In Buzan’s (2014: 98) characterization: 
‘Here one would find everything from the UN system, through arms control treaties, to the regimes 
and institutions for managing trade, finance, environment, and a host of technical issues from 
postage to allocation of orbital slots and broadcast frequencies’. In Bull’s schema the exact 
relationship between constitutive principles and regulatory rules was not drawn out, which may 
explain why it has been ignored for so long. Buzan, by contrast, posits such a relationship. In his 2004 
work, he proposed that secondary institutions, or international organizations, exist to operationalise 
primary institutions. In the current work he writes, ‘the great society of humankind may have force 
as a moral referent, but for the most part it lacks the agency to implement and defend universal 
rights. Only states, or secondary institutions largely under the control of states, can do that’ (Buzan, 
2014: 115). In Buzan’s conception, secondary institutions are, first, an empirical indicator of primary 
institutions, and secondly, in Spandler’s (2015: 8) a ‘positive materialization’ of them. They are 
required to fill out the existential potential of primary institutions and give them definition. Buzan’s 
discussion of the WTO in From International to World Society? and its relation to what he identifies 
as the ‘master institution’ of the market, and the constitutive principle of ‘liberalising trade’ (Buzan, 
2004: 187), makes this clear. The rules of the WTO are the empirical manifestation of the market 
norm; they are also the procedural rules required to operationalize the ‘market’; and the 
instructions to its officers, for example, the regulations for the Appellate Body, are required to link 
the generality of the rules to specific instances of them. 
 
Several developments followed Buzan’s (2004) characterization. First, his former research student 
Laust Schoenborg laid out the essential elements of Buzan’s schema comparing his schema with 
other attempts to order institutions among English School writers (Schoenborg, 2011). It was picked 
up by the editors of the Wiley Guide to the English School of International Studies (Navari and Green, 
2014) and a more developed version would eventually appear in the Guide. Secondly, and following 
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on from that, a small working group was convened under the auspices of the English School section 
of the International Studies Association (ISA), chaired by Christian Brütsch who had written an 
important article linking the IMF to the primary institution of diplomacy (Brütsch, 2014). The group 
included Schoenborg, Tonny Brems Knudsen and the present writer, who together planned an 
‘innovative panel’ for the ISA conference in San Francisco in 2014. The group produced a number of 
theoretical postulates, the most important of which was that of Knudsen (2013: 18): ‘Although 
international organizations are secondary to the primary institutions, they are important to their 
reproduction and working, and therefore also to changes in their working’.  
 
In this formulation, Knudsen adds an important qualifier to the Bull/Buzan formulation. It is not merely 
that secondary institutions are a deposit of the primary institutions and are, as Buzan had already 
postulated (and Bull had implied), important to their ‘working’. They also have some independent 
effects on them.  First, they have reproduction effects: secondary institutions such as the United Nations 
not only instantiate but also reproduce versions of primary institutions—in generative terms, they bring 
them about in successive processes, and accordingly possess potential causal properties in relation to 
them. Secondly, in the generative process, changes can be, and he goes on to say inevitably are, 
introduced into the primary institutions. He illustrates this process by reference to both the laws of war 
and the non-intervention principle. Pointing to the ‘reservation of the use of force for the common good 
and the revival of humanitarian intervention, international criminal jurisdiction and international 
trusteeship’ he observes that such developments in primary institutions ‘owe a lot to the UN especially’ 
(Knudsen, 2013: 19).  
 
Knudsen also attempts a clarification of the underlying nature of a primary institution. First, as 
opposed to Bull and Buzan, he does not assign to primary institutions only constitutive principles, 
and to secondary institutions only the regulative processes, as was implied in the Bull and Buzan 
distinctions. Drawing on Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall’s (1989) keynote article on 
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institutions and international order, he argues that primary institutions have both constitutive and 
regulative effects on states and their interaction. He uses as an example the constitutive principle of 
the balance of power, namely (in Vattel’s classic formulation) that no one can lay down the law to 
others, together with the evident implication that imbalances must be adjusted in one way or another. 
There were different working practices of the balance of power between the 19th century and today. 
Knudsen (2013: 16) writes: ‘From these observations I suggest that we distinguish between the consti-
tutive principles inherent in fundamental institutions and the range of practices by which they may be 
reproduced or organized.’ By this distinction, Knudsen not only intended to defend the continuity of 
‘fundamental institutions’ (his preferred term for primary institutions), but also to clarify their nature. A 
primary institution, such as diplomacy or great power management, is not a single ‘thing’. Rather, it is a 
clutch of norms in which are admixed constitutive principles and regulative directives. Accordingly, ‘a 
fundamental or master institution may be defined as (1) a (set of) constitutive principle(s) that make 
meaningful interaction possible, and (2) an associated set of practices by which the constitutive 
principles are reproduced at a given point in time’ (Knudsen, 2013: 16). From this proposition he 
deduces that while some principles might be deposited as material organization, others will remain at 
the level of commonly understood practices.  Great power management and diplomacy are obvious 
examples. Great power management is reproduced in the Security Council; as Knudsen (2013:15) 
writes: ‘The constitutive and organizing importance of the UN and its Security Council to great-power 
management is plain to see’.  But the norm also exists independently of the Security Council, and the 
practice also goes on outside it. (In his paper he does not give examples of this, but they are not hard to 
find; for example, the role of Germany, not a permanent member of the Security Council, in the 
construction of the ‘New Europe’ after the collapse of communism, ‘coalitions of the willing’, and the 
present obsession with ‘rising powers’).  With regard to diplomacy, some of its principles have been 
deposited in the organization of the resident embassy and the established rules of diplomatic exchange, 
but others remain at the level of commonly understood practices. 
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These distinctions provided Knudsen with an all-important proto theory of change. Knudsen (2013: 16-
17) writes:  
 
Consequently, institutional continuity is represented by the ongoing reproduction of one or 
more constitutive principles which are preconditions of meaningful interaction (order, justice, 
international society as such), while institutional change can be understood as (A) changes in the 
practices by which the constitutive principles are reproduced or maintained (= change in a 
fundamental institution), or in rare cases, (B) changes in the constitutive principles themselves (= 
change of a fundamental institution).  
 
One implication of this understanding is clear: the workings of international organizations can introduce 
change into the primary or foundational institutions. He relates his own conception back to the Wendt 
and Duval argument ‘that although fundamental institutions are more constitutive of interaction, 
making things possible, while international organizations are more constraining, both types of 
institutions have both qualities’ (Knudsen 2013:15). 
 
In the meantime, and quite independently of the ISA working group, a young scholar at Tübingen 
was preparing a thesis on the evolution of diplomatic practices and institutions in South East Asia. A 
constructivist in orientation, Kilian Spandler automatically cancels out power and power shifts as the 
fundament for understanding change in such practices, much less ‘interests’. But he is clearly not 
satisfied with a purely ideational account, not even in the variants of idealism provided by post-
structuralism.  He wants to develop some kind of political process theory of the constitutive effects 
of secondary institutions; that is, a theory in which secondary institutions have some independent 
effects, but that do not float on some cloud of ideas, not even those that were tied to systems of 
production, or interests, or power. In casting about, he fell upon Buzan and the ‘correction’ Buzan 
was attempting in the understanding of the evolution of secondary institutions. He also fell upon the 
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English School and the notion of primary institutions as practices. Beginning with a critique of the 
English School, he began to develop a model of the relations between primary and secondary 
institutions that envisioned a process of interaction between them, linked by a politics of practice, 
and that he could use to explain change in the diplomatic institutions of East Asia. 
 
His critique of the English School essentially revolves around the isolation into which the original ES 
theorists had consigned their primary institutions, apparently to be untouched by change. Secondly, 
he takes on the constitutive/regulative distinction and the idea that some institutions are 
constitutive while others are merely regulative, noting how widespread the distinction had become 
(Spandler, 2015: 9; the relevant footnote points to Reus-Smit (1997) who  differentiates between 
fundamental institutions and issue-specific regimes; Kal Holsti (2004) who distinguishes between 
foundational and procedural institutions; and Dunne (2001) who separates constitutive norms from 
more specific rules). Having noted it, however, he rejects it, observing that secondary institutions are 
not only more dynamic, they are also much more constitutive of international order than the classic 
picture portrays, exactly echoing Knudsen’s view. At this point he begins to construct his own model, 
part of the stated aim being to ‘establish international organisations and regimes as a crucial part of 
the English School agenda’. It also aims to enlighten ‘the political mechanisms that lead to continuity 
and change in international institutions’ and account for ‘the political nature of change in 
international society more broadly’ (Spandler, 2015: 1, 4). 
 
In his own account of the relations of primary and secondary institutions, Buzan was bothered by the 
possible identity between constituting and regulating, and the difficulty of distinguishing them in 
practice. He preferred to ‘nest’ some practices in others, referring to those that ‘stand alone’ as the 
primary institutions and to the others as ‘derivative’ (Buzan 2004: 178-81, 187), an orientation he 
does not depart from in Introduction.  The Spandler model gets around this difficulty by 
distinguishing two kinds of constituting. To Constitutionalism 1, he assigns the basic definition of 
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actors and the specification of legitimate behavior, while Constitutionalism 2 involves role ascription 
and sanctioning and ‘altering of preference structures’; that is, elements of regulation (2015:11-12). 
These are speech acts in Searle’s sense, carrying forward Buzan’s understanding of them but it also 
points to the different aspects of constituting, something like Buzan’s ‘derivative’ institutions, but 
with a much clearer specification of their nature. Spandler also clarifies where these activities are 
located, in the continuous reproduction of them by the ‘players’. The ‘basic rules’, in Buzan’s terms, 
do not exist apart from their reproduction by the players. Secondly, Spandler does not use the term 
regulating, but rather institutionalizing; if Constitutionalism 2 takes on the form of a rule within an 
institutional structure (a secondary institution in Buzan’s terms) it becomes institutionalized (2015: 
11). The basic premise of the Spandler model is that secondary institutions, as well as primary 
insitutions, are constitutive of international practice, but they are so in different ways. Primary 
institutions are the source of Constitutionalism 1—the definition of actors and legitimate behavior. 
But importantly, ‘secondary institutions are constitutive as well, namely by ascribing differentiated 
roles to actors and by empowering them to engage in specific forms of interaction that would not be 
possible without the existence of those institutions’ (Spandler, 2015: 11). The process is modeled in 
a two-tiered structure in which primary institutions send down Constitutionalism 1 as well as 
elements of institutionalization, while secondary institutions—international organisations and 
regimes—send up Constitutionalism 2. It is an elaboration of the Buzan model that solves the 
problem of the agent-structure confusion. 
  
It is set in motion by exogenous shocks: what sets the whole process going in Spandler’s schema are 
major wars, radical shifts in the distribution of power, or waves of decolonialization (2015: 18-20). 
Critical shocks push the processes of constitutionalization and institutionalization, leading to 
elaboration but also to restrictions. Importantly, shocks also introduce legitimation shift in the 
primary institutions, which will be institutionalized by iteration. Timing and context is thus decisive 
for institutional development. He writes: ‘When and in what institutional context critical shocks 
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appear will greatly affect the forms secondary institutions will take’ (2015: 20). There is thus an 
inevitable historical aspect to any account of international society and its social forms. Historicizing 
allows the analyst to identify those ‘political mechanisms that lead to continuity and change in 
international institutions’, which, as Holsti (2009: 145) reminds is the ultimate objective of the 
English School.  And it all started with Buzan’s distinction between primary and secondary 
institutions. 
 
In the final chapter of his Introduction to the English School, Buzan establishes a future research 
agenda which gives his own way forward. In it he returns to the functional method used by Bull to 
identify the ‘necessary ingredients for order’; that is, asking what any functioning system would 
require to produce the desired outcome. He makes the cogent criticism that ‘[h]uman societies can 
be …almost endlessly inventive about the social forms…they generate’ (Buzan, 2014: 175), and that 
no fixed set of primary institutions could be derived from a functional method.  He then turns to 
Holsti, from whose work he derived the original inspiration for the institutional focus of his 2004 
work, and who provided a set of criteria for identifying primary institutions through their presenting 
characteristics—the classic empirical method. These are he reminds us: (i) patterned, recurrent 
practices; which are (ii) framed by coherent sets of ideas that make them purposive; and (iii) 
supported by norms and rules that prescribe and proscribe legitimate behavior (Buzan, 2014: 176).  
He supports the classical empirical method, despite his own evident longing for a definition with 
‘fixed bookends’, and has accepted the inevitability of historical change in primary institutions and 
(though less emphatically) the requirement to search out practices in historical processes (Buzan, 
2014: 170, 175, 178). He also supports the suggestion that secondary institutions might well be a 
source for identifying the norms and rules that support primary institutions (Buzan, 2014: 176). With 
this agenda, the present writer is in whole-hearted agreement. 
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Taking the English School Forward 
 
Barry Buzan, Emertitus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, UK 
  
Let me start by thanking all the participants in this forum for their careful reading and thoughtful 
appraisal of my work, and especially Peter Wilson who organised what was originally a conference 
panel into a journal forum. I have very few quibbles with how the participants have represented 
what I have said, and overall I am pleased that the book has been broadly received as fit for its 
intended purpose. That comes as something of a relief, because as Peter Wilson notes, I was not the 
obvious choice to author a book introducing the English School. I am a latecomer to its ranks, and 
although I have a pretty good command of its literature, my own work is very much to one side of its 
mainstream. I might even be placed, as Wilson suggests, outside the English School, though I think – 
and hope – that that is a minority view. To offset this handicap, I submitted both the book proposal 
and the penultimate draft to a substantial cross-section of ES scholars, and paid close attention to 
their comments at both stages. All of them found the book broadly fair and representative even if it 
was not much like what they would have written had they taken the job. But I certainly accept that 
nothing is more difficult that taking a detached and impersonal view of things in which one is deeply 
involved. This book, as the participants in this forum have rightly and ruthlessly pointed out, still 
bears the distinctive marks of my authorship, most notably in its preference for structural 
approaches. 
 
In what follows I will concentrate mainly on engaging with the key points of comment and criticism, 
either by contesting them, or by accepting them and trying to develop them further. Mainly the 
participants take lines independent of each other, so except where the overlap is large, I will 
organise my responses loosely author by author. If there is a core theme to my remarks, it is perhaps 
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that one of the things that makes the English School so compelling is the wealth of interesting topics 
both empirical and theoretical that remain to be engaged if its development is to be taken forward. 
If my book plays a useful role in identifying elements of that agenda, and inspiring others to take 
them up, then it will have fulfilled the ambitions I had for it.  
 
Yongjin Zhang adopts the elegant approach of the classical English School by organising his 
comments into sets of threes, and his explanations of what I was trying to do are often clearer than 
my own. He rightly notes that I have been unable to escape my structural inclinations even when 
discussing the normative side of the English School. He also rightly observes that contesting the drift 
towards a solidarist versus pluralist perspective in the English School’s self-understanding, and 
setting it up in spectrum form as ‘and’ rather than ‘versus’, has been a core theme of my 
engagement with the English School. It was a passing comment by Molly Cochran that set me 
thinking along those lines, and in the end it became a major structuring device for the whole book. 
One consequence of both this concern, and my structural predilections, has been, as Zhang correctly 
points out, to develop a definition of solidarism that some, perhaps most, of those committed to a 
normative approach to the English School find uncomfortably wide. Although in my view, the 
differentiation between state-centric and cosmopolitan solidarism solves a lot of problems and 
misunderstandings, it also threatens hard line positions within both pluralism and solidarism. There 
is perhaps a case for staging within the English School a debate about the standing of state-centric 
solidarism. It seems to me undeniable not only that such a thing exists in practice, but also, and 
more arguably, that it occupies a bigger and more important space than what then become the 
extreme ends of pluralism and cosmopolitan solidarism. Perhaps another label would be preferable, 
but whatever this thing is called, it needs to be integrated into English School concepts and theory. It 
can be repositioned and renamed, but it cannot be ignored or eliminated. 
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Zhang is also right to pick up my remark about seeing the pluralist-solidarist formulation as having 
similarities to the East Asia formulation of yin-yang relationality, where each side in a dyad 
(dark/light, male/female, active/passive, open/closed, etc.) is necessarily present in the other. 
Opposites cannot exist alone. He begins to open up an extension of this link by suggesting that 
pluralism is historically yang, and solidarism more yin. I had not thought about developing the 
comparison along those lines – and would not have had the knowledge to do so even if I had 
thought of it – so this opens up another dimension that is well worth exploring in more depth. Here, 
perhaps, is an opportunity for English School scholars from Asia, who are more likely than 
Westerners to have a solid understanding of yin/yang dialectics. Developing the linkages between 
yin/yang and pluralism/solidarism would not only deepen the understanding of all within the English 
School about this dyad, but also open a door into Western discourses for East Asian theorizing, and 
perhaps help to increase the understanding of, and interest in, the English School approach to 
International Relations in East Asia.  
 
Tonny Brems Knudsen focuses on two questions:  
1. how can primary institutions be open for change and yet continue to serve as pillars of modern 
international society? and  
2. what are the limits to solidarist international  change? 
On the first he argues that the core Westphalian institutions cannot disappear without undoing the 
whole society of states, and so sees colonialism and slavery as a somehow more dispensable form of 
institution. On this point I find Knudsen too wedded conceptually to the Westphalian/Western 
model of international society. In this he is close to Bull, whose framework almost conflated the idea 
of international society itself with that model. My view of international society, as noted by Zhang, is 
much more fluid and open. I can imagine an international society even where sovereignty and 
territoriality had become obsolete. All that is required is some form of multi-actor system in which 
the actors have a significant degree of autonomy, and also seek some degree of order in their 
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relationships. A system of sovereign states is one form of this but not the only one. Systems of 
empires or tribes would also qualify. I therefore think that, like many in the classical English School, 
Knudsen underestimates the importance of the disappearance of colonialism as an institution. That 
disappearance involved the delegitimation and disappearance of both empires as the core actors of 
international society, and colonialism as a legitimate practice. Empires have been something of a 
skeleton in the closet for the classical English School, which like the rest of IR has focused on systems 
of states. But up until 1945, empires were arguably the dominant form of actor in the international 
system/society, and once that is understood Bull’s classical set also look more vulnerable. Knudson 
cannot escape the fact that core primary institutions do sometimes disappear. In my view no 
primary institution is sacred, and order is dependent only on the existence of some such institutions, 
not on any particular ones. 
 
Also on the first question, and proposed as a solution to the dilemma of order/change, Knudsen, and 
also Cornelia Navari in this forum, and others elsewhere, promotes a distinction between 
constitutive principles (durable) and associated practices (which though reproducing the institution, 
are often changing). To the extent that the distinction between constitutive principles and associated 
practices is compatible with Holsti’s (2004) distinction between ‘changes of’ versus ‘changes in’ 
primary institutions, I have no difficulty with it. I also agree with him and Navari that the 
principles/practices distinction is a good way into exploring the relationship between primary and 
secondary institutions. Navari’s contribution below is a useful introduction to the work that is now 
beginning to address this important question, showing how primary institutions enable secondary 
ones, and secondary ones are seen as part of the reproductive practices of primary ones.  
 
On the second question, although Knudsen buys the opening up to state-centric solidarism, he 
nevertheless argues from both Lauterpacht and from empirical practice, that individuals are now 
acknowledged as carriers of rights and responsibilities, most notably human rights. This goes much 
63 
 
further than being a mere extension of state sovereignty, and reflects the development, up to a 
point, of genuine cosmopolitan solidarism. Given the limits of my current knowledge about 
international law, I am not sure about the validity of this argument, though I can see that the case 
for it has significant foundations. It should be a key point of enquiry and debate for the English 
School, because confirmation of it would have big consequence for how we understand the nature 
of contemporary international society. As Knudsen hints, if confirmed, it would make international 
society contain more than one type of legitimate player, or member, and open up interesting vistas 
for progressive thinkers. At the same time, its cost would perhaps be somewhat greater than he 
hints. As well as the everyday differences and contestations he acknowledges, this move might well 
deepen what could be a constitutive gulf within interstate society between those states that accept 
a cosmopolitan version of human rights, and those, most notably China, that do not. In this sense, it 
risks re-opening the zero-sum perspective on pluralism and solidarism. 
 
Part of any debate about this could be an enquiry into the neglected question of what constitute 
primary institutions in world society? Secondary institutions in world society are pretty clear in the 
form of international nongovernmental organizations and innumerable forms of transnational 
networks, which might be seen as the functional equivalent of regimes in interstate society. But 
what the equivalent of primary institutions might be remains largely unexplored. My taxonomical 
formulations pose the interstate, transnational and interhuman domains as conceptually separate, 
which leads to asking questions about what kind of institutions one might find within each domain. 
Knudsen argues that what we are seeing is the emergence of a hybrid international society, and that 
the structure of primary and secondary institutions increasingly reflects that. I think there is perhaps 
still room for thinking in terms of separate domains, but Knudsen opens the possibility that a more 
important, and more likely, prospect is that these domains will become increasingly conflated in 
hybrid forms of international/world society. He could be right. If so, that would put a different twist 
on the nature of the enquiry into how to identify the primary institutions of world society.  
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Peter Wilson opens with a rejection of the ‘reconvening’ idea from the late 1990s. For the record it is 
worth noting that that aspect of the initiative – the idea of recreating something like the British 
Committee’s formal structure of regular discussion meetings – anyway failed when the ESRC refused 
my application to fund it. They did so on the grounds that the English School was ‘too English’, which 
was such an idiotic response as to close the door on that idea. He then takes me to task for not fully 
understanding Carr as a forerunner of raison de système, and for missing the significant contribution 
of English School writers to the history of ideas. These are both fair points, and the latter might 
make an interesting book project for someone better versed in political theory than I am.  
 
Wilson’s main critique is about how to ground the primary institutions of international society. He 
and I have sparred on this point for some time. We certainly agree that it is a central problem for the 
English School, though we go in different directions about how best to address it. The book contains 
a fairly detailed review of the different approaches to it, including Wilson’s. He and I even agree that 
for now, the only viable approach to identifying primary institutions is an empirical one. Lacking any 
better idea at the moment, and aware that this problem is far from having been resolved, I am 
happy for my work to be judged on the consistency (or not) between my definitions and the 
evidence offered for practices that meet those criteria. I am aware of the defects and limitations of 
this position, and I accept many of the critiques of it. But I am strongly confident that primary 
institutions do exist, both because so many other serious thinkers orbit around the concept in one 
form or another, and because without such a concept the idea of society itself becomes void – as 
indeed does the English School. The problem is not about whether such institutions exist or not, it is 
about how best to analyse them. Wilson’s idea is to adopt a Manning-like approach of trying to see 
how statespersons see them. My preference, in sympathy with Navari’s and Knudsen’s arguments, 
would be for a more structural approach, looking for indications of primary institutions in the 
65 
 
constitutions and practices of secondary ones. Having been unable to crack this nut myself, I am 
deeply glad to see others take up the task. 
 
Paul Sharp indulges himself in a characterisation of realism as a racing shell, fast, slim and full of 
purpose; liberalism as a cruise ship with a stratified class structure; and the English School as a 
rather ramshackle houseboat with a fragile structure and little sense of direction. His nautical 
metaphor appeals to my boyish interest in ships, and I would perhaps take this game back to the first 
half of the 20th century. From that perspective, realism might be seen as a dreadnought battleship: 
fast, bristling with heavy guns, clad in thick armour, visually impressive, and mistakenly thought to 
be the ultimate weapon of its day, though in fact highly vulnerable to attack both from underwater 
by submarines and from the sky by aircraft. Liberalism might best be thought of not as a cruise ship, 
whose itinerary is meandering, but as a liner in a rule-bound system operating with a firm sense of 
direction. Being rather splendid vessels, both the dreadnought (like the USS Arizona, HMS Hood, the 
German battleship Bismark, and the Japanese one Yamato) and the liner (think of the Titanic and the 
Lusitania) make a dramatic impact when sunk. In this perspective the English School might best be 
thought of as a tramp steamer, with a polyglot crew and a mixed cargo, steaming from place to place 
in search for trading opportunities, and generally tying together the system of world trade. The 
tramp steamer requires and reflects a loose general framework of order. The individual vessels are 
generally sturdy, but mundane and pass without notice. Their collective absence, however, would 
create a crisis across the system. Perhaps the fragile and leaky houseboat is a better characterization 
for the post-structuralist’s vessel? 
 
Sharp rightly raises the danger posed by my book (and others of the systematizing genre) of 
imposing a single orthodoxy or interpretation onto a diverse body of thought and people. This is an 
especial danger if the essence of the ES is, as he puts it, to value ‘the ambiguities, limitations and 
consequences of the ways in which both practitioners and theorists think about international 
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relations’. It is partly a generic problem embedded in the nature of the enterprise, and partly also 
linked to the worry discussed earlier about my either being outside the English School mainstream, 
or possibly outside the English School altogether. This is a fair point, and all I can say is that I am 
happy to be part of an ongoing dialectic between ‘builders’ and ‘interpreters’, and being on the side 
of the systematisers, to challenge the interpreters to improve their act. 
 
When Sharp advocates at the end of his piece that ES types should just relax and get on with 
pursuing whatever ideas and puzzles they find interesting, I am happy to agree, for that in my view is 
where creativity is most likely to come from. But I think he misses one strength of the ES, which is 
also one of the good reasons for producing systematising reflections about it. That strength is the 
extraordinary richness of research topics on offer within the ES, ranging from highly abstract 
theoretical questions (e.g. about the nature of primary institutions) to quite specific empirical ones 
(e.g. about the history and structure of international societies other than the current one, or about 
the numerous encounter stories yet to be told, especially from the perspective of those subjected to 
the encounter). This richness is, in my view a huge resource for the ES in attracting PhD students, 
and contrasts with the shrinking appeal of narrow, mid-range, methodologically driven research 
prospects into which neorealism and neoliberalism have driven themselves. Sharp’s take on the 
English School, although insightful, is to my mind, and like Knudsen’s, in some ways a bit too 
backward looking and Western-parochial. Perhaps the big future for the ES lies not in the 
Anglosphere from which it came, but in the rest of the world, which is eager to get its own histories 
and political philosophies into the game of IR. If I am right about this, then the name ‘English School’ 
may become increasingly misrepresentative, even ironic. That, in my view, would be a profoundly 
welcome development. 
 
As already discussed above, I am strongly sympathetic to the general direction of work pointed to by 
Cornelia Navari. I would make only one niggling quibble about the misrepresentation of my view (p. 
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8 of the draft) as saying that like Bull, I assigned ‘to primary institutions only constitutive principles, 
and to secondary institutions only the regulative processes’. In my 2004 (p. 180) book I quite 
explicitly opened the door that she and Knudsen want to walk through, and Spandler seems to have 
done already, by noting that those who study secondary institutions make plausible claims that such 
institutions have constitutive effects on the states that compose their memberships. I was, and 
remain, unconvinced by the established assumption that a clear distinction can be made between 
constitutive and regulatory rules, and I agree fully that this problem needs a better quality of 
attention than it has received so far. 
 
To conclude, let me once again thank the participants for their stimulating engagement, and take up 
Knudsen’s implication that I should do the work of taking my argument beyond the pluralist/state-
centric solidarist nexus by opening into the cosmopolitan part of solidarism as well. I can certainly 
agree that this should be explored, but whether at this increasingly late stage in my career I have 
either the time or the energy to do so, is a question. Fortunately, the English School seems to be in 
pretty good shape, with an increasingly impressive number, range and depth of scholars across the 
generations and across the planet attracted to its perspective and tradition. I am confident that good 
and important questions like these will be addressed and debated regardless of whether it is me or 
someone else who takes them forward. 
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